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The Necessity in Antitrust Law
Gregory Day*
Abstract
Antitrust rarely, if ever, gives primacy to a dispute’s subject
matter. For instance, exclusionary conduct that raises the price
of a lifesaving drug receives the same analysis as a restraint of
baseball cards. Since antitrust’s purpose is to promote consumer
welfare, the equal treatment of important and mundane goods
might appear perplexing. After all, competition to produce
affordable foods, medicines, and other necessities would seem to
foster consumer welfare more than inane products do.
In fact, defendants generally win antitrust lawsuits even
when monopolizing necessities because the primary method of
antitrust review is notably deferential to defendants. To explain
this landscape, the high prices available in a monopoly should
incentivize rivals to enter the market, creating competition and
correcting the market. Additionally, people may presumably
mitigate high prices by buying a lesser substitute or nothing at
all. Since courts apply the same level of deference regardless of
the market’s importance, a defendant who cites an efficiency
gained from excluding competition can typically survive
antitrust scrutiny.
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This Article argues that core pillars of antitrust make little
sense with necessities. An exclusionary act in an essential market
extracts an added premium reflecting society’s vulnerability,
making the costs of market power much greater than with
mundane goods. The effect is that antitrust courts have
systematically underestimated the costs of monopolies and trade
restraints in essential markets, causing them to misidentify
anticompetitive acts as procompetitive. Indeed, whereas
antitrust assumes that consumers enjoy options when faced with
monopoly pricing, people who need a necessity such as a
life-saving drug will pay the high prices so long as they can. The
implications are many. First, a larger spectrum of consumers
must pay the monopoly rates. Second, whereas a cartel of artisan
belt makers may only charge so much before consumers purchase
mass-produced belts, a monopolist can demand a greater
premium without losing consumers. Third, this landscape
incentivizes collusion since firms can extract more money from
more people. Fourth, anticompetitive conduct is more likely to
harm marginalized groups who suffer higher switching costs (for
example, self-medication over expensive pharmaceuticals) or
even complete deprivations of necessities. This Article argues that
the concepts of essentialness and inelasticity must be integrated
into the substantive analysis of whether conduct is
anticompetitive. It provides a logical framework to do so using a
seldom employed approach called the “quick look,” which would
flip the burden onto the defendant and thereby strip the typical
analysis of its deference in essential markets. In fact, since
confusion over when the quick look is proper has made it a
rarity—despite widespread support for its usage—this Article’s
approach would establish an effective place for the test. Also,
recognizing the greater level of harm inflicted on especially
marginalized populations, the proposal would enhance welfare
by beginning to disaggregate the term “consumers.”
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INTRODUCTION
Any company may technically make the non-patented drug
Daraprim, which cures a fatal parasitic infection.1 The drug’s

1. See Press Release, FTC, Six More States Join FTC and NY Attorney
General’s Case Against Vyera Pharmaceuticals, Martin Shkreli, and Other
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maker, Vyera Pharmaceuticals, entered exclusivity agreements
with suppliers of the drug’s active ingredient to prevent generic
companies from making a rival version.2 Vyera also induced
vendors to withhold Daraprim from competitors who needed
samples of it to satisfy the process of approving a generic drug.3
These tactics sparked an antitrust lawsuit in 2020 alleging that
the destruction of competition and creation of monopoly power
enabled Vyera to jack up Daraprim’s price from $17.50 to $750
per tablet—a 4,286 percent increase.4
A chief reason why Vyera could exponentially raise
Daraprim’s price involves the drug’s importance. Since those
who suffer from toxoplasmosis may die without treatment,5
most patients are willing to pay any amount for a cure.6 Absent
competition, Vyera leveraged the gravity of their patients’
situation to increase prices beyond what the typical monopolist
could charge.7
Given the humanitarian dangers of pricing toxoplasmosis
patients out of the market, it seems odd that antitrust cares
little about whether society needs the monopolized good. After
all, collusion that eliminates competition for a lifesaving drug
receives the same level of scrutiny as a restraint of artisan
belts.8 Since antitrust’s purpose is to promote “consumer
welfare,”9 the equal treatment of important and mundane goods
Defendants (Apr. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/N9L2-TJ7N (discussing the
drug’s generic manufacturers).
2. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 5–6, FTC v. Vyera Pharms., LLC, 479
F.
Supp.
3d
31
(S.D.N.Y.
2020)
(No.
1:20-cv-00706-DLC),
https://perma.cc/QE9M-M7A9 (PDF).
3. See Vyera Pharms., 479 F. Supp. 3d at 39.
4. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at ¶ 89.
5. See id.
6. See infra Part III.A (explaining the economics of monopolizing
necessities).
7. See Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 295–313.
8. Compare Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 907 (2007) (using the “rule of reason” to assess a restraint of trade in the
artisan belt market), with FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013)
(applying the “rule of reason” to a restraint in the pharmaceutical market).
9. See Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd.,
833 F.3d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 2016) (“At their core, the antitrust laws are a
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978))); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2 (Harvard Univ. Press ed.
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might seem perplexing. As such, wouldn’t competition to
produce affordable foods, housing, drugs, and other necessities
foster consumer welfare more than competition for garden
variety goods?
In fact, a monopolist like Vyera can generally evade
antitrust liability altogether.10 This is because the primary
method of antitrust review—the rule of reason—is notably
deferential to defendants such as Vyera who “virtually always
win” competition lawsuits.11 To explain antitrust’s preset
against liability, the high prices available in a monopoly should
incentivize rivals to enter the market, creating competition and
correcting the market.12 Also, consumers may mitigate high
prices; if a cartel raises widget prices, one can presumably buy
a lesser substitute or nothing at all, limiting the cartel’s
effects.13 Since courts apply the same level of deference
regardless of the market’s importance, a defendant who cites an
efficiency gained from excluding competition can typically
survive antitrust scrutiny.14
2008) (reciting that after antitrust’s “counterrevolution of the 1970s and
1980s . . . . [t]he only articulated goal of the antitrust laws is to benefit
consumers, who are best off when markets are competitive”).
10. The antitrust case brought against Vyera, according to precedent and
the district court, is indeed subject to the rule of reason. See Vyera Pharms.,
479 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (“The plaintiffs assert a violation that is assessed under
the rule of reason.”).
11. See Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95
MINN. L. REV. 59, 87–88 (2010) (explaining antitrust’s “total-welfare” and
consumer welfare standards where the analysis measures the surplus losses
between efficient and inefficient outcomes).
12. See Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by
Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 35 (2004)
[hereinafter Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution] (explaining the belief that
markets self-correct in the face of supracompetitive prices).
13. See George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago
School on Modern Antitrust Law, 57 J.L. & ECON. S1, S7 (2014) (noting that
markets tend to self-correct, which influences the narrowing of antitrust’s
scope); Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Law and Economic Theory: Finding a
Balance, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 126–27 (2013) (“Chicago School economists,
relying on the neoclassical model and its two basic assumptions that (1)
markets are self-correcting; and (2) firms and consumers generally behave
rationally and act as profit-maximizers, urged that vertical restraints are
rarely, if ever, anticompetitive and almost always serve to promote
competition.” (footnote omitted)).
14. See, e.g., Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 3d 578, 593–617
(N.D. Cal. 2020) (analyzing a trade restraint of an HIV drug without giving
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This Article asserts that excluding competition in essential
markets inflicts a greater level of harm which antitrust misses.
The added injury is shown to reflect society’s need for the
necessity and thus vulnerability. Key to this analysis is that
antitrust has inadequately considered a salient feature of
necessities: inelastic demand. As a result, courts have
systematically underestimated the costs of monopolies in
essential markets, causing them to misidentify anticompetitive
acts as procompetitive.
The issue is that the core pillars of antitrust’s framework
make little sense when applied to necessities. Whereas antitrust
assumes that consumers enjoy options when faced with
monopoly pricing, people who need a necessity will pay the high
prices and thus lack as much cost-sensitivity. For example, a
cartel of artisan belt makers may only charge so much before
consumers buy mass-produced belts, but people who depend on
a life-saving drug will pay whatever the premium (so long as
they can).15 The effect is that a greater spectrum of individuals
will pay monopoly prices for necessities than for garden variety
goods.16 Second, without fear of losing consumers, a monopolist
can demand an even greater markup; after all, a cartel of artisan
belt makers may only raise prices to the point where people lose
their willingness to buy expensive belts whereas a monopolist
like Vyera can escalate prices until people lose the ability to

primacy to the drug’s saliency); Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284
(2018)
To determine whether a restraint violates the rule of reason, the
parties agree that a three-step, burden-shifting framework applies.
Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden to prove
that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive
effect that harms consumers in the relevant market. If the plaintiff
carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show
a procompetitive rationale for the restraint. If the defendant makes
this showing, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be
reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means. (citations
omitted).
15. See Rolls-Royce PLC v. United Techs. Corp., No. 1:10cv457, 2011 WL
1740143, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2011) (suggesting that markets for necessities
might always be inelastic).
16. See infra Part III.A.
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pay.17 Third, due to the inelasticity of necessities, it incentivizes
collusion since firms can extract more money from more
people.18
In fact, anticompetitive practices in essential markets may
disproportionally harm marginalized groups.19 To illustrate,
monopolies have caused certain drug prices to triple since
1997,20 impacting uninsured individuals the most.21 Likewise,
collusive agreements among fast food companies have frozen the
salaries of 40 million low-wage workers.22 And as prices increase
due to uncompetitive markets, many companies have
abandoned low-income neighborhoods, depriving poorer areas of
nutritious
food
(“food
deserts”),
financial
services

17. See Assoc. for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 675–76 (4th
Cir. 2018) (Wynn, J., dissenting) (criticizing “unconscionable” drug pricing
practices that prey on, physicians’ willingness to “continue to prescribe the
drug, even in the face of substantial price increases”).
18. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 947 (explaining the inverse relationship
between inelasticity and opportunities for collusion).
19. See Klobuchar Introduces Legislation to Modernize Antitrust
Enforcement and Promote Competition, AMY KLOBUCHAR (Feb. 1, 2019)
[hereinafter Klobuchar Antitrust Legislation], https://perma.cc/U8KZ-KDJW
(remarking that antitrust is “more than price and output” but instead is about
“our everyday lives, from the price of groceries at the market to the cost of
prescription drugs”); cf. Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and
Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 235, 285 (2017) (arguing that some monopolies create such
substantial harm that courts should condemn even “no-fault” monopolies). See
generally Brian S. Feldman, The Decline of Black Business, WASH. MONTHLY,
Mar.–May 2017, https://perma.cc/4HKK-68U6 (explaining the effect of
monopoly power on Black-owned businesses).
20. See Curtis E. Haas, Drug Price Increases: Here We Go Again?,
PHARMACY TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://perma.cc/MEB6-EG88
(“Drug costs in the United States began steeply climbing in 1997, tripling
between 1997 and 2007.”).
21. See, e.g., Dean Baker, End Patent Monopolies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2016, 2:07 PM), https://perma.cc/27WA-XL2F (discussing the difficulties of
monopolies in the pharmaceutical industry); Austin Frakt, How Patent Law
Can Block Even Lifesaving Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://perma.cc/Z6QZ-GBX6 (identifying the importance of monopolies in the
pharmaceutical industry).
22. See Gregory Day, Anticompetitive Employment, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 487,
495 (2020) [hereinafter Day, Anticompetitive Employment] (describing the
ubiquity of labor cartels among minimum wage employers).
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(“underbanked”),23 and technology (the “digital divide”).24 This
dynamic was observed as far back as the seventeenth century
when the directors of the East India Company noted that a
“monopoly of the necessaries of life . . . is liable to the greatest
abuses.”25 So given the potential to deepen social and economic
inequalities,26 it is curious that antitrust lacks a meaningful
inquiry into the underlying good’s importance.27
This Article asserts that antitrust law should remedy
anticompetitive practices in essential markets with a variation
of a seldom used approach called the “quick look.” Rather than
the current framework in which courts presume that the
restraint was justified, the quick look flips the burden onto the
defendant who must prove how excluding competition
benefitted consumers.28 It would recognize that the rule of
reason’s deference is misguided where a necessity’s inelastic
demand has enabled cartels to extract more wealth from more
consumers. And since confusion over when the quick look is
proper has made it a rarity—despite widespread support for its
usage—this Article’s take on the approach would establish a
logical place for it.29
In essence, the following proposal would improve antitrust’s
internal logic and better promote consumer welfare in the most
important markets. It would accord with case law, which
23. See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
24. See Nell Abernathy, The Effects of Market Power on Women and
People of Color, ROOSEVELT INST. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/8SPH-Y9DN
(explaining that technology companies disinvest in underserved
neighborhoods to maximize profits).
25. ROY MOXHAM, THE GREAT HEDGE OF INDIA 33 (2001).
26. See James A. Schmitz Jr. & David Fettig, Monopolies: Silent
Spreaders of Poverty and Economic Inequality, PROMARKET (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/U4NK-ENL8 (highlighting the economic vulnerabilities of the
poor and marginalized).
27. See Press Release, Joe Biden, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force
Recommendations 67 (July 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/S4S4-PK9K (PDF)
(seeking to add broader criteria to antitrust regulation’s analytical
consideration, including the impact on the labor market, underserved
communities, and racial equity).
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope
and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 463–64 (2000)
[hereinafter Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look] (describing the support for
quick look analyses).
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dictates that a more stringent level of review should apply when
conduct renders reliably anticompetitive effects.30 This proposal
is far from farfetched. In the realm of merger enforcement under
the Clayton Antitrust Act,31 federal agencies have observed that
inelasticity can make anticompetitive conduct “more profitable”
and increase “the prospect of harm”32—yet this dynamic
remains absent in assessing whether conduct is anticompetitive
under the Sherman Act.33 And since restraints of necessities
disproportionally harm marginalized groups, this Article shows
that antitrust’s beneficiary of “consumers” is far from
homogenous;34 indeed, incorporating inelasticity into the test of
anticompetitiveness would begin to disaggregate the standard
of “consumers” and recognize the disparate impact on at-risk
groups.35 Another benefit is that firms would more cautiously
exclude competition in essential markets unless they can ex
ante justify the effects of doing so.36
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
concept of a necessity and provides examples suggesting that
monopolies in essential markets create heightened economic
and social costs. Part II reviews the history of the Sherman Act
to explore the role of economics in enforcement as well as the
unimportance of the underlying good. Because antitrust law has
evolved in a manner where enforcement seldom condemns
exclusionary conduct, the discussion explains why defendants
enjoy broad latitude in suppressing competition regardless of
market. Part III argues that antitrust must incorporate the
economic concept of elasticity into the substantive analysis of
whether exclusionary conduct is net anticompetitive. If the
monopolized or restrained good’s demand is inelastic, the
potential for abuse is reliably great enough that the rule of
30. See infra Part III.B; cases cited infra note 191 and accompanying text.
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (recognizing that a company can anticompetitive
before a merger-to-monopoly).
32. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 26 (2010) [hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/PF6T-8DKZ (PDF).
33. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; see Gregory J. Werden,
Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363, 406–07
(1998) (exploring inelasticity in merger enforcement).
34. See infra Part III.C.
35. See infra Part III.C.1.
36. See infra Part III.D.
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reason’s deference would no longer make sense; instead, the
quick look would effectively flip the burden to deter the
heightened rates of abuse. It would also establish a rigorous role
for the quick look analysis, which has so far languished due to
fears of arbitrary or populistic enforcement. This position
receives support from microeconomics, critical race theory, and
the Sherman Act’s legislative history. The last Part discusses
implications—ranging from merger enforcement and scholarly
debate over antitrust’s purpose, to harmonizing antitrust with
the idiosyncratic areas of enforcement in which the good’s
saliency or inelasticity does matter. As examples, courts have
scrutinized inelastic demand to define the market, impose
criminal penalties, as well as target certain cases for
government enforcement.
I. MODERN CONCERN FOR MONOPOLIES
A monopoly is not illegal unless it was achieved via illicit
means.37 Due to this framework, anxiety is mounting about the
prevalence of monopolies in essential markets.38 Problems
include not only higher prices but also a panoply of
non-economic injuries affecting social welfare, democracy,
inequality, and national security. In light of America’s
“monopoly problem,”39 Part I.A reviews the concept of a
necessity. Then, Part I.B canvasses essential markets in which
monopolies may pose greater risks in terms of conventional
antitrust injuries like high prices as well as non-antitrust
concerns like social or political harms.

37. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438,
44748 (2009) (explaining that the Sherman Act targets “the willful
acquisition or maintenance” of a monopoly power, not its “development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”
(quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966))).
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. See, e.g., Klobuchar Antitrust Legislation, supra note 19 (advocating
legislation to protect consumers by limiting monopolies); Ryan Grim, Bernie
Sanders Vows to Revive Criminal Prosecutions of CEOs for Unfair Trade
Practices, INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2019, 4:18 PM), https://perma.cc/4URA-M2VT
(noting that monopolies in the pharmaceutical industry have caused serious
health problems).
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A. Necessities
Identifying a necessity (or “essential” good) may initially
appear like a tricky task, but economic theory provides an
effective template. To start, some commentators characterize
necessities as “[c]ommodities such as food, water, and health
care [that] are essential to life.”40 Because this description
involves social constructions based on one’s perception of
essential41—e.g., electricity—it is helpful to conceive of
necessities as existing on a spectrum. For instance, while some
scholars list housing and health care as necessities, many people
live without these commodities.42 This suggests that a necessity
is not entirely required for survival. A better description is goods
and services “that make possible social and economic
well-being.”43
In economics—which is central to antitrust law—the
hallmark of a necessity is inelastic demand.44 Goods with
inelastic demand are those that consumers buy at roughly the
same rates even when prices rise.45 Although no good is perfectly
inelastic, people who need a certain good will generally purchase

40. Gregory M. Stein, Inequality in the Sharing Economy, 85 BROOK. L.
REV. 787, 810 (2020) (emphasis added).
41. See id. at 810–11 (contrasting the relative essentiality of certain
commodities depending on the circumstances).
42. See Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for
Cash-Based Public Assistance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 847, 849 (2002) (“What seems
like a luxury to one person often ends up being a necessity to another.”); K.
Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through
the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2448–49 (2018)
(listing healthcare, housing, and water as necessities).
43. Rahman, supra note 42, at 2450.
44. See Sean T. Murray, Comparative Approaches to the Regulation of
Electromagnetic Fields in the Workplace, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
177, 183 n.39 (1995)
The demand for electricity is inelastic because it is such an
irreplaceable fixture in modern society. In other words, people
“need” electricity and will, therefore, pay much more for the good,
allowing utilities to extract monopoly profits. While this use of the
term “need” may not comply with the strict economic definition of
“necessity,” it reflects the inelastic nature of the demand for
electricity. (internal citations omitted).
45. Id.
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it regardless of price, hence making its demand inelastic.46 For
instance, if gasoline prices increase, consumers in the aggregate
will buy similar amounts; not only must people still commute to
work, but airlines and other businesses cannot easily diminish
their purchasing in the present.47 While inelastic goods involve
more than necessities—luxuries and vices are often
inelastic48it is seldom difficult to identify when people have
bought a good out of necessity.49 The concept of essentialness
may thus bely a perfect definition. Yet antitrust scholars and
economists would likely agree that a necessity is a good or
service that society values as salient to our collective wellbeing,
reflected by a significant level of inelastic demand.
In important part, attempts to exclude competition in
essential markets may generate an array of socioeconomic
problems beyond high prices. It seems that restraints of
necessities can particularly target and harm marginalized
populations.50 The next discussion illustrates this point using
examples from the labor, financial services, and similar
markets.

46. See Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and
Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service
Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REGUL. 19, 35 (1999) (providing examples of inelastic
goods, for which demand does not change significantly, regardless of price
changes).
47. See Eliana Eitches & Vera Crain, Using Gasoline Data to Explain
Inelasticity, BEYOND NOS. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/3KN9-KMAU
(showing that the volume of gasoline purchases remains constant, regardless
of the price of gas, because individual households’ demand for gas stays
constant due to the lack of available substitutes and the necessity for gas in
many citizens’ daily lives).
48. See Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 668 (Kan. Ct. App.
2014) (reviewing evidence that the demand for cigarettes is “highly inelastic”);
see also Neil Gormley, Greening the Law of Advertising: Prospects and
Problems, 42 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 27, 48 (2011) (“Lower courts have not always
followed the Court in its skepticism of supply and demand, perhaps out of
suspicion that the demand for alcohol is exceptionally price inelastic.”).
49. See Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional
Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIA. L.
REV. 729, 785 (1987) (differentiating necessities and luxuries as inelastic).
50. See infra Part III.C.1.
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B. Modern Anxiety over Monopoly Power in Essential Markets
Few types of monopolies present as much danger as the
pharmaceutical industry. While market power may seem like a
natural effect of patent rights,51 allegations persist about the
tactics used by drug companies to impede generic competition
(such as Vyera in the Introduction),52 extend patent rights
beyond twenty years,53 and prevent development of competing
drugs.54 This landscape has reportedly limited society’s access
to lifesaving pharmaceuticals,55 evidenced by those who struggle
to afford EpiPens,56 as well as critical drugs used to treat HIV,57
cancer,58 and other diseases.59 And since low-income groups tend
to lack insurance and suffer from more health issues, society’s

51. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[P]atent laws reward the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates
him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.”).
52. See, e.g., In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 680–84
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (discussing how drug companies “product hop” to block
competition, potentially violating antitrust law).
53. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 154–60 (2013) (ruling that
“reverse payments” by drug companies to extend their patent rights beyond
twenty years can offend antitrust law).
54. See In re Loestrin Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d 307, 348–54 (D.R.I.
2017) (analyzing whether the pharmaceutical company engaged in sham
litigation to impede generic competition).
55. See Press Release, FTC, FTC and NY Attorney General Charge Vyera
Pharmaceuticals, Martin Shkreli, and Other Defendants with Anticompetitive
Scheme to Protect a List-Price Increase of More than 4,000 Percent for
Life-Saving Drug Darapim (Jan. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/WM3L-G2EK
(stating that the increase in price “significantly impacted access” to the
life-saving treatment).
56. See Sydney Lupkin, A Decade Marked by Outrage over Drugs Prices,
NPR (Dec. 31, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://perma.cc/VPK3-K6KZ (noting that
Mylan raised EpiPen prices more than twelve times over six years, to prices
as expensive as $300).
57. See Gregory Day, Competition and Piracy, 32 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 775,
811–15 (2017) (explaining how patent rights kept AIDS treatments from
consumers).
58. See Mustaqeem Siddiqui & S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of
Cancer Drugs and What You Can Do About It, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROCS. 935,
935–38 (2012), https://perma.cc/UJ42-L7AL (PDF) (crediting the high prices of
cancer drugs to monopolies).
59. See id. at 941 (“As long as we have a for-profit system involved in the
manufacture of lifesaving drugs, we will always run the risk of high costs.”).
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most vulnerable have unevenly incurred the effects of drug
monopolies.60
Perhaps as worrisome is the absence of competition in the
market for financial services. Research has found that
anticompetitive bank mergers impair consumer welfare in the
traditional sense—e.g., higher fees, lower interest rates, and
reduced credit availability—as well as levy unique injuries on
lower-income groups.61 Given the saliency of financial services,
anticompetitive mergers have reportedly deprived poorer areas
of banks, enabling check-cashing shops and predatory lenders to
fill their void.62 And when large banks acquire local ones, the
underbanked “have been more likely to experience evictions and
have debts sent to collection agencies.”63
One of the more troubling forms of monopoly power among
industry insiders—though scholarship is just beginning to
notice—involves food.64 Oligopolies in the beef, pork, wheat,

60. See Wendy Rogers, Evidence-based Medicine and Equity: The
Exclusion of Disadvantaged Groups, in EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE IN MEDICINE
& HEALTH CARE 129, 129 (Ruud ter Meulen et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the
link between poor health and poverty).
61. See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Bank Mergers and
Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition, 61 J. FIN.
495, 509–14 (2006) (“[B]orrowers appear to receive bank financing less
frequently when banking markets become less competitive . . . .”); VITALY M.
BORD, BANK CONSOLIDATION AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: THE ADVERSE EFFECTS
OF BANK MERGERS ON DEPOSITORS 6–9 (Dec. 1, 2018), perma.cc/RLC9-TESN
(PDF) (establishing how bank consolidation can negatively impact low-income
depositors); Robin A. Prager & Timothy H. Hannan, Do Substantial Horizontal
Mergers Generate Significant Price Effects? Evidence from the Banking
Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 442–49 (1998) (showing that mergers
exceeding Department of Justice guidelines may have caused interest rates
less favorable to consumers).
62. See BORD, supra note 61, at 23–25 (explaining that “acquisitions of
small banks by large banks cause an increase in the number of check cashing
facilities in the zip code”); Rohit Chopra & Jeremy Kress, Comment of FTC
Commissioner Rohit Chopra and Professor Jeremy C. Kress (Oct. 16, 2020),
perma.cc/SHZ5-GSKJ (stating that check-cashing companies and other
predatory institutions proliferate in low-income neighborhoods after bank
consolidations).
63. Chopra & Kress, supra note 62; see Garmaise & Moskowitz, supra
note 61, at 496 (“[N]eighborhoods that experience greater reductions in bank
competition . . . are subject to future higher interest rates, diminished local
construction, lower real estate prices, and an influx of poorer households.”).
64. See Cartels Beware: The Antitrust Division Launches Criminal
Investigations in Key Industries, DOJ (Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Cartels
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eggs, and similar markets have shared information to monitor
each other’s output to keep supply low and prices high.65 One
cannot overstate the dangers of food cartels, as almost everyone
must pay the high prices.66 In 2019, Pilgrim’s Pride fixed and
increased chicken prices by 50 percent—affecting 98 percent of
chickens sold in the United States—as the company generated
$11.4 billion in revenue.67 And as low-income communities lose

Beware], perma.cc/PJ7Z-J44H (asserting that the DOJ intends to target “key
industries” such as food markets); PHILIP H. HOWARD, CONCENTRATION AND
POWER IN THE FOOD SYSTEM: WHO CONTROLS WHAT WE EAT? 4–5 (David
Goodman & Michael K. Goodman eds., 2016) (describing negative impacts of
monopoly power in the food industry, including “consumers paying higher
prices, suppliers receiving lower prices, or reduced innovation”).
65. See In re Pork Antitrust Litig., No. 18-1776, 2019 WL 3752497, at *3
(D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2019) (explaining that pork producers allegedly used a data
program, Agri Stats, to monitor each other’s behavior to limit output and raise
prices); In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 781 (N.D.
Ill. 2017) (describing the use of Agri Stats by chicken producers); In re
Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (reviewing allegations of anticompetitive behavior in the egg market);
US: Beef Packers Seek Dismissal of Antitrust Suit, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
(Jan. 14, 2020), perma.cc/QGA5-SM5E (explaining allegations of beef packers
conspiring to inflate profits by depressing price of fed cattle); Jonathan
Stempel, Lawsuit Claims U.S. Pork Companies Conspired to Inflate Prices,
REUTERS (June 28, 2018, 6:20 PM), perma.cc/2NDB-G92M (reporting that U.S.
pork companies were accused of conspiring to inflate pork prices).
66. See Cartels Beware, supra note 64 (“The Antitrust Division will
continue to protect American consumers and taxpayers by investigating and
prosecuting criminal antitrust violations across all sectors of the economy.”);
Nina Lakhani et al., Revealed: The True Extent of America’s Food Monopolies,
and Who Pays the Price, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2021, 6:00 AM), perma.cc/K8BLMLUD (stating that supermarkets are quick to increase prices to maintain
profit margins, “but when commodities go down, consumer prices are often
much slower to decrease”).
67. See Eshe Nelson & Carlos Tejada, Pilgrim’s Pride to Pay $110 Million
to Settle Charges of Fixing Chicken Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2020),
perma.cc/B57X-JU28 (describing Pilgrim’s Pride’s chicken-pricing scheme);
David Yaffe-Bellany, Why Chicken Producers Are Under Investigation for
Price-Fixing, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), perma.cc/DK7Z-3XSB (stating that
chicken companies including Pilgrim’s Pride shared detailed information with
Agri Stats in order to increase the consumer price of chicken as the “cost[] of
chicken breeding” fell); see also Jacob Bunge & Brent Kendall, Pilgrim’s Pride
Reaches Plea Deal with Justice Department on Chicken Price-Fixing
Allegations, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2020, 12:36 PM), perma.cc/YQ3D-SH9S
(commenting that Pilgrim’s Pride’s guilty plea “will make it the first company
to admit in court to what prosecutors have alleged was a roughly seven-year
effort across much of the U.S. chicken industry to inflate prices”).
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the ability to afford monopoly prices, dollar stores have replaced
grocery stores, resulting in increased obesity, malnutrition, and
related ailments.68 In fact, the dangers of food cartels have taken
new meaning as COVID-19 ravages meat processing plants,
compelling low-income labor like undocumented workers to toil
in contaminated facilities.69
Speaking of labor, the employment market has only
recently emerged as a pressing antitrust issue.70 This is because
antitrust courts had historically failed to recognize labor as an
economic commodity.71 Another reason is that labor appears
unrelated to consumer welfare since lessening labor costs can
theoretically allow companies to offer cheaper goods, benefiting
consumers.72 This framework had long enabled firms to enter
no-poaching agreements or otherwise collude in ways meant to
suppress laborers’ salaries and mobility.73 But in actuality, labor
is an essential commodity because individuals cannot easily
switch jobs due to the necessity of working.74 It was only when
68. See Jo Moses, America Runs on Poverty: How Food Monopolies Exploit
the Poor, CAMPANIL (Jan. 29, 2020), perma.cc/5U2P-MRCG (“The biggest
contributor to America’s poor health is the fact that for most people, healthy
food is simply too expensive to buy because America’s agriculture is run by
monopolies.”).
69. See Ron Knox, Monopolies in Meat: Endangering Workers, Farmers,
and Consumers, AM. PROSPECT (May 4, 2020), perma.cc/NCK2-PQZ3
(describing how slaughterhouses became hubs for COVID-19 infections in
their communities).
70. See, e.g., No-Poach Approach, DOJ (Sept. 30, 2019), perma.cc/LSZ9LY97 (“Robbing employees of labor market competition deprives them of job
opportunities, information, and the ability to use competing offers to negotiate
better terms of employment.”).
71. See Day, Anticompetitive Employment, supra note 22, at 492
(discussing why courts and enforcers had historically ignored anticompetitive
acts in labor markets).
72. See id. at 491–92 (explaining that courts typically allow labor cartels
as long as “their agreement achieves a goal other than wage fixing”).
73. See Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint
Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), perma.cc/23UL-DNZN
(describing how fast-food chains often have agreements prohibiting franchise
owners from hiring workers away from other franchises); Mike Leonard,
Jimmy John’s No-Poach Suit Merits Class Status, Plaintiff Says, BLOOMBERG
L. (Jan. 6, 2020, 5:08 PM), perma.cc/3V5M-26NF (“The suit claims the
no-poach clauses, which bar Jimmy John’s and its franchises from soliciting
one another’s workers, reduce employee mobility and depress wages.”).
74. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and
Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 314 (1991)
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the New York Times published an article in 2017 showing that
no-poaching agreements dominate minimum wage markets that
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) focused on their
anticompetitive dangers.75 It is striking that no-poaching
agreements affect a quarter of fast-food workers by imperiling
their already below-subsistence wages.76
Curiously, though, antitrust courts have largely deferred to
cartels and monopolists even when necessities are involved.77 In
light of the above evidence, shouldn’t antitrust law increase
scrutiny in the most important markets? After all, if
monopolizing a necessity imposes costs beyond high
pricesdelivering an extra blow to democracy, social welfare,
and marginalized groups—shouldn’t this entail a facet of
consumer welfare? Part II examines why courts have, in
referencing the Sherman Act’s legislative history, embraced
microeconomic theory, eroded antitrust’s potency, and
disregarded any concern for the degree to which society depends
on the restrained good, no matter the effects on disenfranchised
communities.

Labor is an extremely perishable commodity—an hour not worked
today can never be recovered. Although professional athletes have
alternative occupations, those with real talent are so scarce that
their wages as athletes are generally well above the wages available
in their next most lucrative endeavor. Accordingly, the supply of
labor effort for each individual athlete is quite inelastic. Collusion
among employers can drive the wage down to the individual’s
reservation wage.
75. See Abrams, supra note 73 (explaining how the no-poaching rules did
not face DOJ scrutiny until two suits challenged their legality); Leonard, supra
note 73 (stating that the suit against Jimmy John’s is part of a greater trend
of suits challenging no-poaching agreements).
76. See Abrams, supra note 73 (“The no-hire rules affect more than 70,000
restaurants . . . .”); James Doubek, Eight Restaurant Chains Agree to End
“No-Poach” Agreements Under Threat of Lawsuit, NPR (Aug. 22, 2018, 3:45
AM), perma.cc/TV29-MAZP (explaining how the no-poaching agreements
disincentivize franchises to offer raises by restricting competition).
77. See Day, Anticompetitive Employment, supra note 22, at 492
(“[C]ourts and antitrust agencies have largely refused to condemn labor
cartels, asserting that employers may collude so long as their agreement
achieves a goal other than wage fixing.”).
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II. ANTITRUST LAW’S INDIFFERENCE TO NECESSITIES

Modern enforcement has been called “antitrust
minimalism” because it seldom condemns cartels and
monopolists.78 This landscape arose in the 1970s when courts
and scholars sought to reform antitrust law based on two
sources of authority: the Sherman Act’s legislative record79 and
microeconomic theory.80 Under this framework, courts
scrutinize the exclusionary conduct—not monopolized
goodwhich has largely enabled firms to erect barriers to entry
in critical markets.81 This Part reviews the Sherman Act’s
history to explain why antitrust enforcement is so deferential to
exclusionary conduct as well as the enterprise’s failure to
inquire into the degree to which consumers depend on the
monopolized good.
A. The Historical Rise of Antitrust’s Deference
1. The Evolution of the Sherman Act
Antitrust’s deference is attributable to the lack of guidance
in the Sherman Act’s text, which has given non-statutory
sources of authority a key role in defining enforcement’s scope.82
Because courts had supposedly “over enforced” the Sherman Act
78. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the
Indeterminacy of Economics: The U.S./E.U. Divide, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 725,
728 (2006) (discussing antitrust minimalism).
79. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (“[C]ourts
should interpret [the Sherman Act] in the light of its legislative history . . . .”).
80. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7 (1978) (“A
consumer-oriented law must employ basic economic theory to judge which
market structures and practices are harmful and which beneficial.”); Cont’l
T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977) (“Such restrictions, in
varying forms, are widely used in our free market economy. . . . [T]here is
substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting their economic
utility.”).
81. See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 784
(N.D. Ill. 2017) (describing how the defendants used contracts that allowed
prices to fluctuate with the market in order to drive prices up); In re Pork
Antitrust Litig., No. 18-1776, 2019 WL 3752497, at *7 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2019)
(explaining how the defendants colluded to cut pork production and increase
prices through public statements and sharing non-public information).
82. See Priest, supra note 13, at S14–15 (describing Robert Bork’s
influence on the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence).
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for generations after the statute’s enactment, a movement
sought to narrow antitrust’s scope.83 This analysis sets the stage
for the next discussion explaining why antitrust courts seldom
impose liability as well as ignore the underlying market’s
importance.
Consider the broad language in the Sherman Act: Section 1
bans “every” restraint of trade84 while Section 2 makes it illegal
to “monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce.”85 The
problem, according to the Supreme Court, is that a literal
reading of these sections would condemn nearly all forms of
business.86 Rather than adopting such an absurd approach, the
Supreme Court noted that the drafters of the Sherman Act
intended to codify the common law of competition, which the
judiciary was later supposed to define.87 And that’s exactly what
happened. In 1911, for example, the Supreme Court reviewed
the common law to rule that enforcement may only condemn
“unreasonable” restraints of trade—as opposed to all
exclusionary acts—even though the Sherman Act lacks this
language.88
Antitrust fully integrated microeconomic theory and
thereby took its modern shape in the 1970s when courts and
scholars sought again to limit enforcement based on its

83. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 75, 79 (2010) (“[T]he law seeks to err on the side of
underenforcement.”).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
85. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
86. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 338
(2d ed. 2003) (“We cannot realistically hope to know and to weigh confidently
all that bears on competitive impact.”); Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution, supra
note 12, at 38 (“To be effective in combating exclusionary strategies by
dominant firms . . . courts must be armed with the tools to act quickly to
preserve the competition of new entrants.”); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of
the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1, 13 n.59 (1983) (“The Brown Shoe decision . . . could, by misconstruing the
proper purpose of antitrust laws, produce the same adverse effect on economic
growth as any clear congressional statement that the antitrust laws serve
multiple yet inconsistent policies.”).
87. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 489 (“[C]ourts should interpret [the
Sherman Act] in the light of its legislative history and of the particular evils
at which the legislation was aimed.”).
88. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 5962 (1911).
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statutory history.89 Before this reform, antitrust was criticized
as adrift because—given the Sherman Act’s vagueness—courts
would often punish welfare enhancing acts such as efforts of
companies to corner the market by offering superior goods at low
prices.90 This inspired, most notably, “the Chicago School”91 to
advocate for a more limited vision of antitrust.92 At the
movement’s head was Robert Bork, who argued that the
Sherman Act’s drafters intended to enact a “consumer welfare
prescription” defined in microeconomic terms.93 If antitrust was
reduced to economic goals, as he asserted, it would more
rigorously foster competition and align enforcement with the
drafters’ goals.94 The Supreme Court adopted a form of Bork’s
consumer welfare vision in 1977 when it embraced
microeconomics in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania.95
89. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the
Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1312 (1999) (“Today’s courts, by requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, preserve the framers’ focus
on competition. . . . The initial threshold of anticompetitive effect is firmly
ensconced in the legislative history.”).
90. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“But
we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets.” (emphasis added)); see also Maurice E.
Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 620 (2012)
(noting that courts should blend social and political goals into clearer rules
and legal presumptions for antitrust).
91. See Priest, supra note 13, at S7 (describing the Chicago School as a
group of scholars who “disdained antitrust law . . . on the grounds that the
market itself would correct any exercise of market power more effectively than
the law and the courts”).
92. See Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 133–34 (2011) (“All antitrust lawyers and
economists know that the stated instrumental goal of antitrust laws is
‘consumer welfare,’ which is a defined term in economics.”).
93. BORK, supra note 80, at 66 (explaining that even though consumer
protection is not as clearly a goal of later statutes, it is still present in the
debates).
94. See id. at 61 (“The legislative history of the Sherman Act, the oldest
and most basic of the antitrust statutes, displays the clear and exclusive policy
intention of promoting consumer welfare.”); Alan J. Meese, Monopolization,
Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743, 773–93 (2005)
(describing the perfect competition model).
95. 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see id. at 49 (“Under this rule, the fact-finding
weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
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Under the modern consumer welfare approach, nearly all
restraints of trade (specifically, Section 1 lawsuits) are
addressed under the rule of reason, which gauges whether an
act has unreasonably caused an economic injury like high prices
or restricted output.96 This approach has typically allowed
defendants to justify excluding competition by citing the
procompetitive benefits of doing so.97 However, courts condemn
as per se illegal a small list of restraints, such as horizontal
price-fixing, that render reliably anticompetitive effects—no
justification can save the defendant.98 A similar analysis of
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects is used to resolve
Section 2 claims involving the market’s (attempted)
monopolization.99

competition.”); see also Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals
of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2013)
(discussing the importance of GTE Sylvania).
96. See Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No.
11-1290, 2011 WL 6935276, at *7 n.8 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011) (“In all cases, the
relevant question is instead whether there has been an adverse effect on price,
output, quality, choice, or innovation in the market as a whole.”); see also
Cudahy & Devlin, supra note 11, at 75–77 (explaining the processes by which
economic theory permitted more conduct that was once considered
anticompetitive).
97. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (describing
a burden-shifting analysis where defendants can shift the burden to plaintiffs
by showing procompetitive rationales for their restraint); see also John M.
Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 506
(2019) [hereinafter Newman, Procompetitive Justifications] (explaining the
use and questions of procompetitive justifications in the rule of reason); Oxbow
Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 926 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C.
2013) (elaborating on how plaintiffs can succeed in a Section 1 claim).
98. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (“This per se approach permits categorical judgments
with respect to certain business practices that have proved to be
predominantly anticompetitive.”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)
(“Per se liability is reserved for only those agreements that are ‘so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality.’” (quoting Nat’l Soc. of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 692 (1978))); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
22122 (1940) (ruling that price-fixing is a per se illegal activity); In re Blue
Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 308 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1277–78 (N.D. Ala.
2018) (stating that “certain group boycotts” are considered per se illegal).
99. Akin to Section 1, the defendant must have committed an
exclusionary act resulting in economic harm. And like Section 1, the defendant
can typically justify the anticompetitive effects with evidence of
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So if antitrust affords most defendants the opportunity to
justify exclusionary conduct, how do courts assess whether a
firm has successfully done so? This inquiry is critical because it
explains why antitrust courts not only defer to defendants but
also ignore whether anticompetitive practices in essential
markets have especially impaired consumer welfare.
2. The Defendant “Virtually Always Wins”
The rule of reason is far from a fifty-fifty gambit since
defendants “virtually always win[].”100 Under the rule of reason,
a court questions whether the exclusionary act produced market
failure or, alternatively, procompetitive efficiencies.101 This is
accomplished by comparing consumer behaviors in the
procompetitive benefits. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
[Section] 2 of the Sherman Act . . . declares that a firm shall not
“monopolize” or “attempt to monopolize.” It is settled law that this
offense requires, in addition to the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market, “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident. . . .” To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession
of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct. (internal
citations omitted)
Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 536, 541 (N.D.N.Y.
1991) (“At the very least, willful maintenance of monopoly power requires the
plaintiff to prove that the monopolist has acted in an unreasonably
exclusionary manner, that is, that the monopolist’s challenged practice has
yielded unreasonable anticompetitive effects.”); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that a defendant can offer
procompetitive justifications to overcome a Section 2 lawsuit).
100. Albert A. Foer, The Political-Economic Nature of Antitrust, 27 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 331, 337–38 (1983).
101. Market failure is when the economy systematically misallocates
resources. For instance, sometimes market failure arises when firms exploit
an existing gap in the law, like when a chemical company legally dumps waste
into local rivers. See Karl S. Coplan, The Missing Element of Environmental
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Compensation for the Loss of Regulatory Benefits, 30
GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 281, 284 (2018) (explaining market failure as a negative
externality in the environmental context); Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l,
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1137 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“The purpose of antitrust law is
not to protect market participants from the market; it is to protect the public
from market failure.”); see also Newman, Procompetitive Justifications, supra
note 97, at 510, 512–13 (discussing the role of surplus in antitrust law).
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restrained market to a hypothetically competitive version of
it.102 When a cartel increases a good’s price, some people will
spend more to buy it while others will purchase a substitute
item or nothing at all; the harm is the gap between one’s first
choice (for example, the preferred good at a competitive price)
and second choice (e.g., spending more on the same item or
buying a less-desirable good).103 The defendant may then justify
an act’s anticompetitive effects by noting its procompetitive
efficiencies (the next subpart offers examples).104 In important
part, few defendants suffer liability so long as they can identify
some procompetitive benefit achieved from restraining trade.105
At the core of antitrust’s deference is that procompetitive
outcomes are thought to underlie most business
arrangements.106 The theory is that firms would struggle to

102. See Newman, Procompetitive Justifications, supra note 97, at 506–08
(describing the two different roles procompetitive justifications play in a rule
of reason analysis).
103. See Day, Anticompetitive Employment, supra note 22, at 521–22
[C]onsumers are expected to abandon those [artificially
high-priced] goods for cheaper products that should correct the
market. For example, if firms colluded to increase the price of their
cherries, consumers would likely purchase cheaper cherries from
other sellers, or even substitute fruit, which would drive the cartel
out of business.
104. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
89596 (2007) (reviewing whether the restraint type may offer procompetitive
benefits, making it more proper to fall under the reason of reason).
105. See Foer, supra note 100, at 338 (“The information necessary to defeat
a reasonableness defense usually is very difficult to obtain, it is expensive to
obtain, and generally there is enough of a basis on which to show some
business rationale that the plaintiff has a very hard and lengthy fight.”).
106. See Carrier, supra note 89, at 1318
[C]ontracting parties that pursued their own interests provided the
“just
cause
or
excuse”
necessary
to
protect
their
behavior. . . . [W]here
the
public
was
not
“serious[ly]
inconvenience[d]” by the parties’ control of the market, the
combination would be sustained as long as “the advantages of the
combination to the parties thereto seemed to be of a legitimate
character.” (footnotes omitted).
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innovate,107 resolve litigation,108 create efficiencies,109 or achieve
other legitimate goals without excluding some competition.110
Another concern is that antitrust’s overenforcement may deter
beneficial forms of competition if firms feared “false positives”
(such as the suffering of antitrust liability for an act that was
actually welfare enhancing).111 Also, firms and consumers may
presumably navigate around monopolies, which can correct the
market without antitrust enforcement.112
In fact, not only do the vast majority of exclusionary acts
receive deference under the rule of reason, but the number is
growing.113 Since GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court has
increasingly removed cases from the per se illegal grouping in
favor of the rule of reason.114 For example, in Leegin Creative
107. See, e.g., Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., Civ. No.
12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (“Once the branded
drug manufacturer offered a procompetitive justification for the product
change that the generic manufacturer could not rebut, courts and juries would
have to determine which product changes were ‘sufficiently innovative’ to
justify their anticompetitive effects.”).
108. See id. at *16 (“The prospect of costly and uncertain litigation every
time a company reformulates a brand-name drug would likely increase costs
and discourage manufacturers from seeking to improve existing drugs.”).
109. See Carrier, supra note 89, at 1303–04 (explaining that the Chicago
School would seldom impose liability given that most practices are, on balance,
efficient).
110. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 17 (1997) (stating that courts
could determine when setting maximum prices acted as a mask for the per se
illegal act of setting minimum prices).
111. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 83, at 84 (stating that “false
positives” are deliberately siphoned off resulting in “many consumer-injuring
acts” going unpunished); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (“Antitrust is costly. The judges act with imperfect
information about the effects of the practices at stake. The costs of action and
information are the limits of antitrust. I ask in this essay how we should
respond to these limits.”).
112. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
113. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (remarking that the rule of reason determines the majority of
cases).
114. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A
New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753,
175758 (1994) (“The history of antitrust analysis since GTE Sylvania has
been, with only a few exceptions, a steady erosion of the per se approach to
analyzing Section 1 conduct and an expanded use of the rule of reason to
consider a restraint’s economic impact.”); Richard M. Steuer, Indiana
Federation of Dentists: The Per Se-Rule of Reason Continuum (and a Comment
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Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,115 the Supreme Court ruled
that lower courts must now assess vertical price restraints
under the rule of reason rather than the old way of per se
illegality.116 This trend away from per se illegality has notably
eroded antitrust’s bite, empowering firms to exclude competition
provided that the rule of reason applies (which it almost always
does).117
In important part, antitrust lacks safeguards for essential
markets. Each level of review scrutinizes the specific conduct
alleged to have caused harm rather than the good monopolized
or restrained.118 Under either the rule of reason or per se
approach, the relative importance of gasoline and baseball cards
is irrelevant.119 Note, however, that the rule of reason could
implicitly give more (negative) weight to restraints of essential
goods if courts actually compared the costs and benefits of
excluding competition—but in practice, almost all restraints are
declared procompetitive.120 That said, the same is also true of
procompetitive justifications: an act could especially benefit
consumers in an essential market.121

on State Action), 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1987) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has increasingly determined that cases should be judged under
the rule of reason).
115. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
116. See id. at 907 (“Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to
the rule of reason.”).
117. See Abbe Gluck, Case Note, Preserving Per Se, 108 YALE L.J. 913, 915
(1999) (“By importing the jurisdictional effects requirement into the elements
of the substantive offense, the court dispossessed the per se rule of its powerful
presumptions.”).
118. See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 784
(N.D. Ill. 2017) (evaluating antitrust violations by considering food producers’
anticompetitive practices, but not the necessity of the food).
119. See Rahman, supra note 42, at 2461 (explaining how monopolies in
essential markets could have extremely detrimental effects on consumers).
120. See Foer, supra note 100, at 337–38 (“[W]hen the rule of reason is
applied, the defendant virtually always wins.”).
121. See Newman, Procompetitive Justifications, supra note 97, at 513
(“[I]f a challenged restraint somehow benefits the competitive process, the
defendant may avoid antitrust liability.”).
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One could argue that the process of measuring damages can
redress anticompetitive conduct in essential markets.122 The
theory is that courts may calculate the heightened damages of
restraining or monopolizing necessities into the plaintiffs’
award, which would ostensibly account for the elevated
injuries.123 However, so long as antitrust offenses are rarely
found, the levying of damages is more or less irrelevant. After
all, the threat of elevated punishment is hardly effective if no
one is actually punished.124
This landscape has endured because pinning liability to the
challenged act provides clear rules.125 For example, if a firm
engages in horizontal price-fixing, it can expect to incur per se
liability.126 The efficiency of predicting one’s risks has thus
sustained antitrust’s framework.127
But has the rule of reason produced equitable results with
respect to essential goods? Consider the labor, pharmaceutical,
and broadband markets. In each instance, rather than raising
the defendant’s bar due to the market’s importance, courts have
generally deferred to the defendant in finding that the
exclusionary conduct was procompetitive.128 It is notable that
marginalized groups have, as the next subpart explains, tended
to suffer heightened or specialized injuries.

122. See HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, A PRIMER ON ANTITRUST DAMAGES 27–28
(2011), https://perma.cc/HP9P-CGT5 (PDF) (describing the “overcharge”
method of calculating damages when there is a monopoly).
123. See id. at 28 (“The overcharge ‘caused’ by a particular antitrust
violation could be considerably less if the market was not performing
competitively before the violation occurred.” (internal citations omitted)).
124. See id. at 6 (noting a relationship between “underdeterrence and
socially costly antitrust violations”).
125. See Newman, Procompetitive Justifications, supra note 97, at 506–07.
126. See nFinanSe, Inc. v. Interactive Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No.
1:11-CV-3728-AT, 2012 WL 13013003, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2012)
(explaining that horizontal price fixing is per se illegal under the antitrust
laws).
127. See Newman, Procompetitive Justifications, supra note 97, at 513
(explaining that the rule-of-reason analysis fits comfortably within the
framework of antitrust law).
128. See infra Part II.B.
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B. Examples of Procompetitive Justifications in Essential
Markets
1. Labor
Courts have often cited the benefits enjoyed by employers in
justifying collusion against workers. In Ogden v. Little Caesars
Enterprises Inc.,129 Little Caesars franchisees secretly refused to
hire each other’s managers who could have earned higher wages
in a fair labor market.130 As the complaint noted, entry-level
workers in the fast food industry receive about $7 billion per
year in public assistance due to their low wages, restrained by
no-poaching pacts.131 The court declared that the collusion was
procompetitive—even though assistant managers earn only
about $11.57 per hour132—because Little Caesars could better
compete against rival chains like Pizza Hut by freezing
salaries.133
Other courts have reached the same conclusion.134 One
opinion likened no-poaching deals to noncompete clauses,
129. 393 F. Supp. 3d 622 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
130. Id. at 627–30.
131. Complaint at 29, Ogden v. Little Caesars Enters., Inc., 393 F. Supp.
3d 622 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (No. 2:18-cv-12792).
132. Little Caesars—Management Salaries in the United States, INDEED,
perma.cc/6B9H-CL9P.
133. See Ogden, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (agreeing with the defendant’s
argument that a vertical agreement between a franchisor and franchisee “that
only restricts ‘intrabrand’ competition” actually promotes competition among
businesses).
134. See, e.g., Haines v. VeriMed Healthcare Network, LLC, 613 F. Supp.
2d 1133, 1137 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (finding a noncompete agreement was not per
se anticompetitive); Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., No.
17CV205-MMA (MDD), 2017 WL 6059145, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017)
(finding no unreasonable restraint to trade when defendant entered into
noncompete agreements with a subcontractor who took on defendant’s
spillover work); see also Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust Paradox, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 381, 383 (2020) (describing the difficulty of demonstrating harm to
consumers); Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power,
132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 549 (2018) (noting “the paucity of antitrust cases
involving labor markets” and urging more substantial enforcement); Ioana
Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets,
94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1038 (2019) (indicating that, despite anticompetitive labor
markets not receiving a great deal of antitrust enforcement until recently, “a
growing body of empirical evidence indicates that labor market monopsony is
a real issue”); Eric A. Posner, The Antitrust Challenge to Covenants Not to
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ignoring the fact that an employee must assent to a noncompete
whereas a no-poaching arrangement is clandestinely imposed
on workers.135 In Eichorn v. AT & T Corp.,136 AT&T sought to
sell a subsidiary by agreeing not to rehire former workers, which
caused wages to decline; here, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit insisted that AT&T had primarily
intended to effectuate a merger and labor’s injuries were
ancillary, justifying whatever burdens were levied on
workers.137 In a case before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, the notion that people enjoy watching
unpaid student-athletes entailed a procompetitive justification
supporting a cartel agreement among universities not to pay
them.138 In each case, the court emphasized the benefits inured

Compete in Employment Contracts, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 165, 171 (2020)
(identifying different courts’ approaches to noncompete agreements in the
antitrust context).
135. See Haines, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 1139
She was, in effect, subjected to a non-compete agreement to which
she was never made aware. Rather than tell Haines directly that
she could not seek work from VeriMed’s clients, VeriMed chose only
to tell its clients that they could not hire Haines. . . . Haines’ injury
did not arise from an unlawful market restraint; it arose from her
own lack of knowledge and VeriMed’s failure to disclose material
information. The antitrust laws are not designed to redress this
type of “informational” injury to a single plaintiff.
136. 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001).
137. See id. at 146
The primary purpose of the no-hire agreement was to ensure that
Texas Pacific Group, as the purchaser of Paradyne, could retain the
skilled services of Paradyne’s employees. Although the no-hire
agreement precluded the employees from seeking employment at
an AT & T affiliate for 245 days, the primary purpose of the
agreement was not anti-competitive. Contrary to plaintiffs’
assertions, we can find no evidence to support their claim that the
no-hire agreement was executed for the improper purpose of
restraining trade and the cost of labor in the telecommunications
industry. The primary purpose of the no-hire agreement was to
ensure the successful sale of Paradyne to Texas Pacific Group which
required workforce continuity.
138. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he
district court found, and the record supports that there is a concrete
procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism: namely, that
the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their appeal to consumers.”);
e.g., Oliver Connolly, Trevor Lawrence Is Already Great at 19. Money Is
Keeping Him Out of the NFL, GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2019, 8:03 AM),
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to colluding employers and ignored the leverage gained from
exploiting the necessity of working and saliency of paying fair
wages.139
2. Pharmaceuticals
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public
Ltd.,140 Warner Chilcott allegedly manipulated the process of
approving a generic drug in order to suppress competition.141
Before the Hatch-Waxman Act,142 a generic firm could only
begin the multiyear process of developing a generic drug after
the drug’s patent—which is typically owned by a “branded”
company like Warner Chilcott—expired.143 The effect is that
cheaper generics were barred from entering the market,
extending the brand’s exclusivity beyond the twenty years
granted in its patent.144 This inspired the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which empowers a generic company to start the approval
process during a patent’s term so that generics can interject
competition into the market at the moment when the patent

https://perma.cc/8M7C-TB8A (outlining the case of a college football star
whose amateur status precluded him from earning millions).
139. See Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 146–47 (finding the no-hire agreement
procompetitive, the court nevertheless recognized that “[w]hile the no-hire
agreement essentially barred the plaintiffs’ ability to retain their desirable AT
& T pension benefits, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act is not the
appropriate vehicle here for redress”); O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073 (“[T]he
NCAA’s compensation rules serve the two procompetitive purposes identified
by the district court: integrating academics with athletics, and ‘preserving the
popularity of the NCAA’s product by promoting its current understanding of
amateurism.’” (citation omitted)).
140. 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
141. See id. at 429 (“[I]t appears that Defendants took a number of steps
regarding the capsules that, in conjunction, Mylan claims violated the
Sherman Act.”).
142. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
143. See Mylan Pharms., 838 F.3d at 427 (“The Act loosened the approval
rules for generics by creating an Abbreviated New Drug Application (‘ANDA’)
process.”); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 152–53 (2013) (recounting the
landscape of the patent process before the Hatch-Waxman Act).
144. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 152–53 (citing the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
legislative history to show that the bill was introduced to reduce the delay in
introducing cheaper generics).
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expires.145 A key condition of the Hatch-Waxman Act, though, is
that the generic drug must constitute a bioequivalent of a drug
currently on the market.146 Knowing this, Warner Chilcott
altered nominal aspects of its drug, Doryx (which treats painful
skin conditions, sexually transmitted diseases, and even
anthrax)147 and pulled old versions from the market.148 This
forced generic companies to restart or abandon the approval
process, allowing Warner Chilcott to charge monopoly prices
beyond the lifespan of its patent.149 The court deferred to
Warner Chilcott in characterizing its “product hop” and “hard
switch” as procompetitive acts without questioning the degree
to which people need Doryx.150

145. See id. at 142 (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing the generic
to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, speed[s] the introduction of
low-cost generic drugs to market, thereby furthering drug competition.”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
146. See Gregory R. Day, Innovative Antitrust and the Patent System, 96
NEB. L. REV. 829, 854–55 (2018) (explaining the manner in which generics can
enter the approval process during a patent’s tenure).
147. Complaint at 11, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd.,
2015 WL 1736957 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (No. 2:12CV03824), 2012 WL
2927119
Doxycycline hyclate is a tetracycline-class oral antibiotic that is
widely prescribed for the adjunctive treatment of severe acne, and
that is also indicated for (1) rickettsial infections, (2) sexually
transmitted infections, (3) respiratory tract infections, (4) specific
bacterial infections, (5) ophthalmic infections, (6) anthrax,
including inhalational anthrax (post-exposure), (7) alternative
treatment for selected infections when penicillin is contraindicated,
(8) adjunctive therapy in acute intestinal amebiasis, and (9)
prophylaxis of malaria.
148. See Mylan Pharms., 838 F.3d at 429 (“Defendants made a number of
other changes to the existing Doryx product and thereafter pulled older
versions from the market.”).
149. See id. (“Each of these changes would have required generic
manufacturers to file, and await approval of, a new ANDA demonstrating the
similarities between their product and the reformulated Doryx product in
order to continue selling generics that were AB-rated to the newest Doryx
product.”).
150. Mark A. Ford et al., Doryx: Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Product
Hopping Claim, WILMERHALE (Sept. 29, 2016), perma.cc/M35U-R6RJ
(explaining that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct increased prices).

THE NECESSITY IN ANTITRUST LAW

1319

3. The Digital Divide
Broadband firms have successfully cited their ability to
make money as a procompetitive justification despite the
anticompetitive effects felt by especially disaffected groups.151 In
one case, Comcast and rivals divided the broadband market so
that each could monopolize a region.152 Comcast justified
colluding based on its newfound largeness, which the district
court affirmed.153 Although the cartel raised prices—to the tune
of about $875 million154—the plaintiffs did not survive summary
judgement.155 By ruling in Comcast’s favor, the court prioritized
telecom monopolists and affluent consumers over those who
need, yet can’t access, reliable internet.
Illustrating the effects of broadband monopolies, roughly
114 million Americans lack internet services,156 nearly half of
151. Cf. Gary Wax, Note, Cable Company Monopoly: Comcast and Time
Warner Control the Board, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 159, 198 (2008)
(“[B]ecause Comcast and Time Warner are accomplished monopolists, they are
able to cloak their anticompetitive conduct so that opponents are unable to
prove actual evidence of dramatic anticompetitive behavior.”).
152. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., No. 03-6604, 2012 WL 1231794, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 12, 2012).
153. See id. at *21
[C]lustering enabled Comcast to realize marketing efficiencies by
increasing its presence across a DMA (thereby enabling its
self-advertising to reach a wider audience), and to realize other
efficiencies . . . . The economies of scale associated with clustering
enabled cable providers to compete with satellite companies with a
national footprint, and telephone companies possessing vastly
larger resources and clusters, who were emerging as competitors in
multiple product markets—video, data, and telephone.
154. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2013) (calculating
$875,576,662 in damages for the class as a whole).
155. See Behrend, 2012 WL 1231794, at *23 (“The Class’s evidence that
Comcast raised prices does not refute the claim of efficiency.”).
156. Twenty million Americans live in regions with no broadband services
and a large portion of the country has been priced out of the market. See, e.g.,
How Increasing Broadband Competition Can Address the Adoption Gap,
VOQAL (Aug. 18, 2020), perma.cc/L6GF-769N (citing FCC data that shows 5.6
percent of, or 18.3 million, Americans lack access to fixed broadband); Karl
Bode, As Pandemic Exposes US Broadband Failures, FCC Report Declares
Everything Is Fine, TECHDIRT (Apr. 29, 2020, 6:42 AM), perma.cc/NX7E-QDSA
(explaining that millions of Americans simply “can’t afford broadband because
the monopolized US telecom sector suffers from a dire lack of competition in
most markets”).
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whom are people of color.157 As the internet becomes an essential
service, the digital divide has fostered other forms of
inequalities. While the ability to work or participate in school
from home has become essential for many158—a privilege denied
to those on the wrong end of the digital divide159—a lesser
known consequence involves the internet’s role in healthcare.160
As hospitals and clinics embrace telehealth, especially during
the pandemic, a pair of doctors described the problem as “many
of our patients could not access the online system.”161 To the
former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan,
“being cut off from basic telecommunications services is a
hardship almost as acute as [deprivations of jobs, shelter, food,
health care, and drinkable water], and may indeed reduce the
chances of finding remedies to them.”162 The effect is that
broadband monopolies have limited the availability of adequate
157. See S. DEREK TURNER, DIGITAL DENIED: THE IMPACT OF SYSTEMIC
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ON HOME-INTERNET ADOPTION 2 (2016),
perma.cc/XZ57-ATZK (PDF) (“[C]ommunities of color find themselves on the
wrong side of the digital divide for home-internet access . . . in a manner that
income differences alone don’t explain.”).
158. Herman G. van de Werfhorst et al., The Digital Divide in Online
Education. Inequality in Digital Preparedness of Students and Schools Before
the Start of the Covid-19 Pandemic (Aug. 18, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/7G7W-8ZS2 (PDF) (studying the effects of “forced and rapid
digitalization” of the learning process by the COVID-19 pandemic).
159. See Christopher G. Reddick et al., Determinants of Broadband Access
and Affordability: An Analysis of a Community Survey on the Digital Divide,
CITIES, Nov. 2020, at 1, 1 (exploring the digital divide among races in San
Antonio).
160. See Anita Ramsetty & Cristin Adams, Impact of the Digital Divide in
the Age of COVID-19, 27 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N. 1147, 1147 (2020)
(explaining that in the early transition to telehealth, a large population lacked
access to needed medical help due to lack of internet access).
161. Id.
162. PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION
POVERTY, AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 40 (W. Lance Bennett & Robert M.
Entman eds., 2001); see Emily Stewart, Give Everybody the Internet, VOX (Sept.
10, 2020, 8:30 AM), perma.cc/V82R-GM5C (“For millions of kids, it means
access to an education. For many workers, it means doing their jobs. For
patients, it means talking to a doctor.”); Sam Gustin, Systemic Racial
Discrimination Worsens the US Digital Divide, Study Says, VICE (Dec. 14,
2016, 11:30 AM), perma.cc/G24L-EQDN (describing internet services as a
necessity); Andrew M. Cohill, Breaking Telecom Monopolies, BROADBAND
CMTYS., Mar./Apr. 2017, at 32, 3233 (describing the challenges imposed by
the current state of broadband internet).
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services to higher-income areas, ignoring the heightened
socioeconomic costs inflicted on marginalized groups.163
Given the above examples, it is noteworthy that antitrust
lacks an inquiry into whether a necessity’s monopolization or
restraint may especially degrade welfare or harm vulnerable
populations. Antitrust’s presumption is that the monopoly was
procompetitive.164 But as the next Part argues, if exclusionary
practices in essential markets were subject to elevated scrutiny,
it would significantly improve consumer welfare in the
traditional sense as well as remedy predatory behaviors aimed
at marginalized populations.
III. REVISITING ESSENTIAL GOODS IN MODERN ENFORCEMENT
This Part argues that monopolists can extract a greater
premium in essential markets equal to society’s vulnerability,
which should trigger heightened scrutiny—curiously, though,
necessities have so far lacked a meaningful place in antitrust’s
framework. The key of this analysis involves inelasticity, which
is a core feature of necessities.165 Part III.A explains that the
monopolization or restraint of necessities poses a greater risk to
consumer welfare and, based on this, courts and enforcers
should account for essentials in the framework to analyze
anticompetitive effects. Part III.B proposes a remedy, and III.C
supports this analysis by referencing additional sources of
authority such as critical race theory and antitrust’s legislative
history.
A. The Hidden Importance of Essential and Inelastic Goods
Anticompetitive practices in essential markets levy a
greater degree of harm, affect more people, and

163. See Reddick et al., supra note 159 (hypothesizing that “[t]he greater
the competition among internet service providers the greater the pressure to
lower broadband costs and create more affordability” among lower income
groups).
164. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015)
(finding the NCAA’s amateurism rules procompetitive).
165. See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int’l Trade 124, 129
(1991) (outlining the relationship between necessities and inelasticity of
demand).
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disproportionally injure marginalized groups.166 Recall that,
under the rule of reason, consumers are presumed to have
options of buying a substitute item or nothing at all; essential
goods, however, upset this assumption due to their inelastic
demand.167 For example, the monopolization of a necessity such
as a life-saving drug is likely to injure a greater sum of
consumers because almost everyone who needs the drug will pay
the higher prices if they can.168 Labor has been called the
“pinnacle” inelastic good since a worker who quits her job loses
the attendant wages while unemployed.169 Because an
individual can never reclaim a lost hour of work, a cartel of
employers may lower wages without suffering much decline in
their labor pool.170 The consequence of leveraging society’s
vulnerability is that consumers cannot safely withdraw from the
market when prices rise, which impacts more people with
garden variety goods.171

166. Cf. Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust for the Economy of Ideas: The Logic
of Technology Markets, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 83, 105 (2000)
A technology or group of technologies is more likely a relevant
market when its derived demand is relatively inelastic, that is,
insensitive to price. With relatively inelastic demand, an increase
in the royalties charged by the hypothetical monopolist above the
competitive level would result in a smaller decrease in the number
of licensees or in the use of technology than if the demand were
elastic.
167. See, e.g., SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 435
(4th Cir. 2015) (describing “building incentives to innovate” as “decidedly
procompetitive”).
168. Cf. Dan Witters, Millions in U.S. Lost Someone Who Couldn’t Afford
Treatment, GALLUP (Nov. 12, 2019), perma.cc/LW7B-ES75 (providing data of
those Americans who could not afford life-saving treatment).
169. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST
LAW & ECONOMICS 72 (1993) (“Labor is an extremely perishable
commodityan hour not worked today can never be recovered.”).
170. See id. (explaining that workers and wages suffer when collusion
artificially decreases demand, given labor’s inelastic supply curve); Yoram
Margalioth, The Many Faces of Mandates: Beyond Traditional Accommodation
Mandates and Other Classic Cases, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 650 (2003)
(describing labor as inelastic).
171. See Daewoo, 15 Ct. Int’l Trade at 129
The responsiveness of these lines to the economic factors which
affect them is termed their “elasticity.” For example, the demand
curves for such things as are considered the necessities of life tend
to have relatively inelastic demand curves, that is to say, the

THE NECESSITY IN ANTITRUST LAW

1323

Second, exclusionary practices enable firms to charge an
even greater premium for a necessity than with garden variety
products. If makers of artisan belts collude, they lose “marginal
consumers” with each extra dollar charged.172 Producers of
essentials, however, can worry less about whether increasing
prices will jettison consumers from the market.173 Whereas the
typical firm is restrained by the willingness of consumers to pay
high prices, a firm operating in an essential market can raise
prices until consumers lose the ability to pay.174 This allows
firms to ratchet up prices to a much greater degree than with
mundane goods.175
In fact, the current landscape creates powerful incentives
for firms to monopolize or restrain necessities. Colluding firms
in essential markets can extract a premium from a larger scope

demand will not fall off significantly in response to price increases
or rise much in response to price decreases.
172. See Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics:
Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1997) [hereinafter
Meese, Tying]
Some, so-called “marginal” customers, view other products as close
substitutes and have relatively elastic demands for the product in
question. Others are so-called inframarginal customers, who,
because they view other items as poor substitutes for the product
sold by the monopolist, have an inelastic demand for it, and thus
will pay a higher price for it. . . . If the monopolist in question had
perfect information, it could “price discriminate,” that is, charge
different prices to different customers: high prices to those with
inelastic demands and low prices to those with elastic demands. If,
however, the monopolist could not distinguish “elastic” from
“inelastic” consumers . . . it would be compelled to set one price for
its product, thereby forgoing some of the profits theoretically
available from its position. (footnotes omitted).
173. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 94 (Denise Clinton et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015) (stating that a
monopolist in an essential market will indefinitely raise prices until
consumers lose the ability to pay).
174. See Meese, Tying, supra note 172, at 143 (explaining that consumers
seek substitutes when demand is elastic, but not when demand is inelasticas
is the demand for necessities).
175. See, e.g., Sebastian Zimmeck, A Game-Theoretic Model for Reasonable
Royalty Calculation, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 357, 385 (2012) (“Similar as in
a monopoly, firms in monopolistic competition face negative sloping demand
curves because demand for a product decreases when price increases.”).
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of people, which creates greater economic rewards and thus
incentives to do so.176
The enhanced damages suffered in essential markets are
described herein as “human costs.” This is because monopolists
and colluding firms can charge an even greater premium equal
to society’s vulnerability.177 And since consumers cannot safely
purchase a substitute good or forgo buying the necessity,
monopolists may exploit their heightened leverage by raising
prices on more consumers.178 The effect is that a greater sum of
deadweight loss is generated, reflecting society’s need for the
necessity.179
Formal models of this dynamic may help. Let’s compare
three situations: a competitive market, standard monopoly
market, and monopoly in an essential market. The Y-axis is a
good’s price and the X-axis is the quantity produced. Under
competition, the equilibrium price of p is where quantity
supplied equals quantity demanded, reflecting the point at
which sellers and consumers jointly maximize their utility (see
Figure 1). A typical demand curve slopes downward because
consumers tend to purchase less of a good as prices increase. The
area above p and below demand, D, represents consumer
surplus because some individuals were willing to pay the higher
per-unit price of D but actually paid the lower amount of p. This
reflects competition’s ability to supply efficiently priced goods.

176. See id. at 381 (“[T]he profit of a monopolist depends on price, cost, and
quantity of a product. However, . . . in a monopoly market the price of a
product increases with decreasing quantity.”).
177. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 173, at 99 (explaining that at a
monopoly equilibrium, a firm creates welfare harms when it increases “its
equilibrium price and earns a larger monopoly profit”).
178. See id. (“As the demand curve becomes less elastic at the monopoly
equilibrium, people are less willing to do without [the] good . . . .”).
179. See id. at 95 (“If a monopoly restricts its output and raises its price
above marginal cost, society suffers a deadweight loss.”).
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Figure 2.

Left, a typical demand curve. Right, the effects of monopolization.

Before modeling the problems of monopolizing essentials,
consider how the typical monopolist decreases output and
increases prices. The line reflecting marginal revenue is
adjusted further left on the demand curve than the competitive
price of p, signifying reduced output (see Figure 2). This is
because, if the monopolist increased output, the good’s price
would fall more than the monopolist’s marginal revenue would
increase. So rather than pricing the good at p, the price is set
where the monopolist reaps the highest total profit. Demand
and output decline as people want fewer units of a good as its
price increases. The area between the monopoly output and
competitive output is called the deadweight loss because it
reflects the value destroyed by eliminating competition.
Here is what’s especially problematic: welfare losses are
even greater in essential markets. With inelastic demand, the
line representing marginal revenue lays even flatter against the
Y-axis since one who monopolizes a necessity is more untethered
from consumer demand (see Figure 3). This permits the
monopolist to produce fewer units and charge even higher prices
than with mundane goods, increasing supracompetitive profits
and deadweight loss. Stated another way, a firm that
monopolizes an essential item will seldom work on the inelastic
part of the demand curve because the firm can continuously
increase prices without fear of losing marginal consumers until
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it approaches the elastic portion.180 Consumers are especially
vulnerable when firms monopolize essential markets.
Figure 3.

The heightened markup in a monopolized market with inelastic demand

Many necessities are only essential for certain groups of
people, but this can actually make the landscape more dire.181
For example, Daraprim is only essential for those who suffer
from Toxoplasmosis.182 This form of monopoly poses a graver
danger because small subsets of people will generally lack the
leverage to lobby for a remedy.183 In fact, anticompetitive

180. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 173, at 94
[A] monopoly never operates on the inelastic portion of its demand
curve. If a monopoly were operating in the inelastic portion of its
demand curve, it could increase its profits by raising its prices until
it was operating in the elastic portion of its demand curve. In the
inelastic portion of the demand curve, a 1 percent increase in the
monopoly’s price causes the quantity sold to fall by less than 1
percent, so that revenues increase. With reduced output, however,
the monopoly’s costs must fall, so that total profits must rise. Thus,
if the monopoly is operating in the inelastic portion of the demand
curve, it should keep increasing its price, obtaining ever more
profits, until it is in the elastic portion of the demand curve.
181. See Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750,
Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), perma.cc/4R5X-76VX (reporting that
“[s]ome hospitals say they now have trouble getting the drug” needed to treat
low-income patients).
182. See id.
183. Naturally, the only people in need of a cure of Toxoplasmosis suffer
from Toxoplasmosis. For everyone else, the drug is extraneous. See id.
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practices have allegedly targeted minority groups intentionally,
given their paucity of power (this dynamic is explored in Part
III.C).
Furthermore, antitrust assumes that consumers are
homogenous, yet disenfranchised groups tend to suffer elevated
harms. While even affluent parties must pay supracompetitive
prices when a necessity is monopolized, low-income populations
are more likely to lack the means to buy, for instance, a
life-saving drug and thus suffer a complete deprivation.184 Also,
switching costs can disproportionally affect disenfranchised
populations.185 As examples, marginalized groups must often
sacrifice other necessities such as food or housing in order to
purchase the monopolized drug.186 In a similar vein, low-income
groups incur the brunt of socioeconomic harm when
check-cashing shops replace banks, dollar stores take the place
of grocery stores, and self-medication supplants high-priced
pharmaceuticals.187
If welfare losses are greater in essential markets, how
should antitrust respond? After all, the deference embodied in
the rule of reason seems misplaced when the monopolization or
restraint of trade imposes a greater magnitude of harm.188 The
next subpart argues that the remedy is to flip the presumption.
Instead of assuming that a cartel promoted consumer welfare as
the rule of reason does, antitrust should account for this
(explaining that “Daraprim is the standard first treatment for toxoplasmosis”
and is rarely used to treat other maladies).
184. See, e.g., Rachana Pradham, For Insulin and Other Medications,
Rising Costs Aren’t Slowing Down, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2020, 11:34 AM),
perma.cc/T7C4-Z6KS (describing the difficulty of some to purchase critical
drugs).
185. See Reddick et al., supra note 159 (finding minority groups in San
Antonio suffered from a disproportionate lack of access to broadband internet).
186. See, e.g., Seth A. Berkowitz et al., Treat or Eat: Food Insecurity,
Cost-Related Medication, Underuse, and Unmet Needs, 127 AM. J. MED. 303,
303–04 (2014) (examining the poverty-caused relationship between underuse
of medication and food insecurity).
187. See Moses, supra note 68 (discussing the relationship between food
monopolies and food deserts); Richard Bookstaber, Risk and the Structure of
the Black Market for Addictive Drugs, 20 AM. ECONOMIST 26, 26–29 (1976)
(explaining the black market for drugs); Lisa J. Servon, The High Cost, for the
Poor, of Using a Bank, NEW YORKER (Oct. 9, 2013), perma.cc/GF5H-VTY8
(discussing the role of check-cashing institutions).
188. See supra Part II.A.2.
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dynamic by compelling
procompetitive effects.

the

defendant

to

prove

the

B. The Longstanding Promises and Challenges of the Quick
Look
Antitrust should address exclusionary conduct in essential
markets with a variation of a seldom employed level of review
known as the quick look. Recall that antitrust has long known
two speeds of scrutiny: deference under the rule of reason in
most scenarios and plenary condemnation as per se illegal in
some others.189 This has typically made the test applied to an
exclusionary act dispositive in assessing its legality.190 Due to
this all-or-nothing framework, courts have sought wiggle room
by establishing a derivative of the rule of reason known as the
quick look, which condemns conduct that can’t be punished as
per se illegal yet creates obviously anticompetitive effects.191
The Supreme Court explained when the quick look is
appropriate:
In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for what
has come to be called abbreviated or “quick-look” analysis

189. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust
Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 50 (2007) (describing the
“dichotomy” of the traditional application of either the rule of reason or per se
illegality).
190. See id. at 57 (discussing the “absolutist nature” of the per se test).
191. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)
(describing the quick-look analysis); see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010,
1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he court is justified in proceeding directly to the
question of whether the procompetitive justifications advanced for the
restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects under a ‘quick look’ rule of
reason.”); Edward Brunet, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look
Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 493, 496 (2009)
With this background of uncertainty regarding the use of summary
judgment in antitrust litigation and the history of controversial
application of the per se and rule of reason labels, the so-called
quick look approach originated. Born in a series of briefs to the
United States Supreme Court in the 1980s, the quick look
methodology was essentially the effort of antitrust specialist
litigators to articulate a sort of middle-ground, efficient way to
avoid overly complex trials. The idea of the quick look might have
evolved from Professor Phillip Areeda’s observation that the rule of
reason need not be overly lengthy and could be “applied in the
twinkling of the eye.”
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under the rule of reason, an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.192

Currently, a court applies the quick look when it initially
assesses that the restraint doesn’t qualify as per se illegal, yet
is “inherently suspect.”193 Upon this finding, a court would
typically declare the restraint to be anticompetitive unless the
defendant can provide evidence of net procompetitive
efficiencies.194 An important way in which the quick look differs
from the rule of reason is that it shifts the burden onto the
defendant who must prove how the restraint benefited
consumers whereas the rule of reason assumes that the act was
procompetitive.195 And while per se illegality condemns
restraints creating anticompetitive effects in almost every
scenario,196 the quick look would—rather than foreclosing all
avenues of justification—place the onus on the defendant to
explain the concrete benefits inured to consumers.197 To
illustrate, the court in North Carolina State Board of Dental

192. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.
193. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (inquiring into whether the restraint is “inherently suspect”).
194. See Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous
Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J.
835, 858–89 (2016) [hereinafter Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing] (explaining
the defendant’s burden to articulate a plausible and legally cognizable
competitive justification for the restraint).
195. See In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 F. Supp. 3d
464, 480 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (“A complete rule of reason analysis in those
circumstances is not always warranted; rather, a ‘quick look’ analysis may be
conducted. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: ‘A quick look
“presum[es] competitive harm without detailed market analysis” because the
anticompetitive effects on markets and consumers are obvious.’”(alteration in
original) (citations omitted)); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and
Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
733, 777 (2012) [hereinafter Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and
Characterization] (“The defining characteristic of the quick look, however, is
its ability to shift a burden from the plaintiffs to the defendants without
‘elaborate industry analysis.’”).
196. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
197. See Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing, supra note 194, at 858
(explaining that the defendant must “articulate a plausible and legally
cognizable competitive justification for the agreement”).
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Examiners v. FTC198 relied on the quick look to rule that “[i]t is
not difficult to understand that forcing low-cost teeth-whitening
providers from the market has a tendency to increase a
consumer’s price for that service.”199
Confusion about when the quick look is proper has
substantially depressed its usage. This is due to the difficulties
of determining what makes an act facially suspect without
delving into the greater analysis.200 If a restraint is supposed to
be reviewed under the rule of reason but seems anticompetitive,
for what reason would a court opt for the quick look rather than
a conventional method?201 One scholar insisted that reliance on
the quick look might even threaten populistic enforcement in
light of the judiciary’s freedom to apply the approach to
notorious actors.202 Said differently, there’s currently no
principled way of identifying when to use the quick look.203
Given these concerns, courts have seldom opted for the quick
look, choosing instead to permit conduct under the rule of reason
or prohibit it as per se illegal.204 As a result, the quick look is
198. 717 F.3d 359, 374 (4th Cir. 2013); see also In re Se. Milk Antitrust
Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 274–75 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Applying this test is useful when
the anticompetitive nature of an agreement is so blatant that a detailed review
of the surrounding marketplace would be unnecessary.” (citing Cal. Dental
Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999))).
199. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 374 (concluding that
the plaintiff’s behavior would likely cause significant anticompetitive harms).
200. See Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization, supra
note 195, at 758 (discussing doctrinal difficulties in apply the quick look
approach).
201. See Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing, supra note 194, at 839
Restraints do not announce themselves as inherently suspect.
Instead, tribunals implementing the quick look must examine all
restraints that survive per se condemnation as an initial matter to
determine whether such restraints are inherently suspect or,
instead, subject to full-blown analysis. Because the result of this
threshold evaluation is generally outcome determinative, plaintiffs
and defendants will rationally expend significant resources
attempting to influence the tribunal.
202. See id. (challenging the claim that the quick look approach “enhances
the accuracy of judicial and administrative assessments of challenged
restraints”).
203. See id. (“[T]he current definition of inherently suspect is far from
precise.”).
204. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 123
(2018) (“Only three Supreme Court decisions have explicitly acknowledged the
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quickly becoming extinct despite widescale support for its
usage.205
But this confusion creates opportunity. An effective way of
enhancing antitrust’s efficacy without risking populistic
enforcement or overenforcement would derive from applying a
test based on the quick look whenever an exclusionary practice
impairs a necessity animated by inelastic demand. This would
improve antitrust’s logic since the presumption of
procompetitiveness makes little sense when a firm has excluded
competition in an essential market. After all, the rule of reason
ignores the greater surplus loss.206 Another benefit is that this
proposal would increase efficiency and predictability since the
quick look obviates the needs for litigants to engage in complex
analysis of the greater market.207 Furthermore, it would
recognize that restraints have often targeted marginalized
groups208 even though antitrust assumes that people are largely
homogenous (as discussed in the next subpart).209 Flipping the

quick look, and then only to reject it under the circumstances.”); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 39, 56
(2017).
205. See Lumber Liquidators, Inc. v. Cabinets To Go, LLC, 415 F. Supp.
3d 703, 712 (E.D. Va. 2019)
It is unclear what staying power, if any, the quick-look approach
retains today, or how much the quick-look differs from an ordinary
rule of reason analysis. The Supreme Court has trended towards
not including the quick-look approach when determining which
antitrust standard should apply, instead preferring the traditional
rule of reason and per se dichotomy. Recently, when the Court has
mentioned quick-look as a possible mode of inquiry, it has found it
inapplicable. Perhaps because of this uncertainty, “lower courts
appear to have largely abandoned the quick look approach.”
(internal citations omitted)
see also Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing, supra note 194, at 838 (“Support
for the quick look is universal within the antitrust community.”).
206. See Newman, Procompetitive Justifications, supra note 97, at 510
(explaining that when it comes to determining which market participants’
surplus is relevant to antitrust analysis, courts prefer to focus solely on
consumer surplus, disregarding situations in which a monopolist’s surplus is
so large that it could hypothetically compensate for consumers’ losses).
207. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2011) (explaining the lack of need for a complex analysis of the underlying
market where the anticompetitive effects of a restriction are clear).
208. See infra notes 222–225 and accompanying text.
209. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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burden would also force firms to consider ex ante how
restraining a necessity would likely harm consumers. And
finally, the approach is tenable because the common law nature
of antitrust enables courts to reinterpret the broad text of the
Sherman Act without requiring an act of Congress.
To determine when a quick look trained on necessities
rather than conduct makes sense, recall that a necessity’s
hallmark is inelastic demand; as such, courts should apply the
quick look when the underlying good is inelastic and essential.
But if the good’s demand is elastic, welfare losses would
partially abate to the normal level since consumers can select a
substitute item, mitigating the anticompetitive effects. For
example, with most non-patented over-the-counter drugs, a
price increase by one company would prompt consumers to
purchase a substitute version—even if the drug is a
necessitywhich would likely correct the market to some
degree. The restraint must therefore affect an inelastic good to
create the presumption that the restraint of trade was especially
harmful.
The commodity must also benefit society. Consider the
consequences of enhancing scrutiny for inelastic items like vices:
condemning a cartel of tobacco companies might actually harm
consumers (in the social welfare sense, not antitrust) if
enforcement made cigarettes more affordable and thus boosted
the rate of smoking.210 Another area of inelasticity where the
rule of reason is superior involves mundane goods. In Town
Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,211—a case
in which Chrysler tied low-quality stereos to its cars—the
dissent favored elevated scrutiny since consumers would seldom
notice or mitigate the high prices stemming from pre-installed
stereos.212 It’s counterintuitive, however, for courts to care more
210. See Barak Orbach, Foreword: Antitrust’s Pursuit of Purpose, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2151, 2155 n.27 (2013) (“To illustrate the difference, consider
the consumer choice to purchase cigarettes. The surplus differs from the
welfare because of health effects. This is true both for the consumer welfare
and the total surplus because of externalities. Similar analysis applies to most
products.”).
211. 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992).
212. See id. at 502 (Sloviter, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (“The fact
that particular consumers may be uninformed or lazy, as the majority posits,
does not forfeit their statutory right to buy in a market which is free of
artificial obstacles.”).
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about consumer welfare than consumers, making the rule of
reason more appropriate.213 That is not to say that antitrust
should avoid competition disputes arising in vice or mundane
markets, but that the deferential rule of reason suffices unless
the good benefits society.
C. Further Evidence
Other forms of evidence supporting this proposal concern
antitrust’s errant assumption that consumers are homogenous
and thereby suffer the effects of exclusionary conduct
uniformly.214 But as we’ve seen, people of color, undocumented
workers, lower-income groups, and other disaffected
communities have especially incurred the costs of
anticompetitive practices, which antitrust has predictably
missed.215 The first discussion asserts that if essentialness was
incorporated into enforcement, it would promote the welfare of
disaffected groups and improve antitrust’s internal logic by
disaggregating the term “consumers.” The second discussion
delves into antitrust’s congressional record—given the
longstanding importance of this authority—to support this
Article’s stance.
1. Power and Anticompetitive Conduct
The monopolization of necessities may especially harm
marginalized groups, though antitrust law has predictably

213. Id.
Chrysler’s ability to force what may have been or is an inferior or
overpriced autosound system on its car buyers need not have come
solely from market dominance. To most car purchasers, the
autosound system is viewed as a small and relatively inexpensive
component of the total car purchase. In economic terms, the
demand for autosound systems may be highly inelastic. If that is
proven, then it is illusory for the majority to conclude that
competition at the automobile level will ensure competition in the
autosound product market. (footnote omitted).
214. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 729–30 (2000) (explaining that the
traditional economic theory suggests that an efficient market is not a
race-conscious market).
215. See supra Part II.B.
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failed to recognize racism and oppression.216 A feature of
antitrust’s premise is that competition benefits “consumers” in
a homogenous fashion akin to the adage that a “rising tide lifts
all boats.”217 Even when exclusionary conduct appears to have
harmed disenfranchised groups, antitrust ignores issues of race
and power since market forces should ostensibly correct
inefficiencies like discrimination—it makes little sense, after
all, for a firm to deny selling a good to a person willing to pay for
it.218
Scholars have long noted that dominant groups design legal
systems to enhance their power at the behest of people of color,
women, indigenous groups, and others.219 Even if discriminatory

216. See Roithmayr, supra note 214, at 732 (stating that conventional
neoclassical theory teaches that, absent barriers to entry, market forces will
eliminate both racism and monopoly profits because of the inefficiencies they
create).
217. See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1897, 1911 (2007) (discussing the theory that competition incentivizes
individual efforts that both produce individual rewards and “make the
proverbial Pie bigger for all”); Day, Anticompetitive Employment, supra note
22, at 506 (discussing the notion that a lack of competition results in high
prices across the market).
218. See Roithmayr, supra note 214, at 730 (“Conversely, race-conscious
distribution is understood to be anticompetitive and inefficient, because race
is not thought to be related to productivity. According to the conventional
story, the colorblind market will produce the most efficient outcome, because
it distributes opportunities and resources exclusively on the basis of ability.”
(footnote omitted)).
219. See, e.g., Michael Siegel, Racial Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings:
An Empirical Analysis Informed by Critical Race Theory, 100 B.U. L. REV.
1069, 1073 (2020) (“The first basic tenet of critical race theory is that racism
is structural—that is, it is built into our systems, institutions, and
cultureyet most conceptions of racism do not recognize this.”); I. Bennett
Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2019)
Critical Race Theory, after all, is committed to confronting “the
historical centrality and complicity of law in upholding white
supremacy (and concomitant hierarchies of gender, class, and
sexual orientation),” and transforming the relationship between
law and white supremacy to reshape American jurisprudence in a
project of racial emancipation and antisubordination. CRT
demonstrates a “commitment to radical critique of the
law . . . and . . . radical emancipation by the law.” And it aims “to
develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of racism in
American law and that works toward the elimination of racism as
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beliefs were eradicated, critical race theory states that little
would change so long as the law is structurally designed to
privilege white people.220 For instance, the anticompetitive
effects of redlining have persisted in that much of America’s
most valuable forms of real estate remain in white hands.221
With this in mind, antitrust law is structured to defer to
dominant groups like monopolists while, at the same time,
lacking care for how anticompetitive practices injure
marginalized groups at greater rates. It is hardly coincidental
that: (1) no-poaching deals have primarily harmed low-income
workers;222 (2) anticompetitive practices in housing markets
part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of subordination.”
(footnotes omitted).
220. See Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and
Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183, 183 (2013)
This opposition entails a systematic articulation of the persistence
of White racial dominance that occurs not only in spite of social and
legal developments that attempt to facilitate greater equality, but
specifically because these developments contain residual privileges
and limitations that nonetheless continue to structurally benefit
Whites and subordinate people of color and other marginalized
communities.
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 46–52, 66–69 (6th ed. 2008)
(discussing the law’s role as a structural impediment to racial equality).
221. See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES
LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 34–35 (2014) (discussing cartel behavior among
white homeowners in which they created and enforced real estate contracts
forbidding the sale of property to African Americans); Robert W. Emerson,
Franchise Selection and Retention: Discrimination Claims and Affirmative
Action Programs, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 559–60 (1998)
Minority franchisees long have argued that franchisors often
engage in “redlining.” Redlining is a pattern of racial discrimination
in which businesses or financial institutions refuse to do business
with persons in certain, usually inner-city, areas due to a perceived
higher level of risk. For example, some studies indicate that
mortgage lenders discriminate against minorities at a level that
“shocks the conscience.” The evidence, though, is inconclusive, as
some scholars infer that the rate of mortgage approvals is actually
much higher for qualified black applicants than for comparable
whites. (footnotes omitted).
222. See Day, Anticompetitive Employment, supra note 22, at 495 (“In fact,
DOJ leadership acknowledged that it only became alarmed about labor cartels
after a New York Times article exposed employer collusion in 2017. The article
found that over 70,000 fast food restaurants have entered no-poaching
agreements (more than twenty-five percent of the industry), imperiling
wages.” (footnotes omitted)).
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have targeted and excluded people of color;223 (3) the lack of
competition in the banking sector has enabled abusive tactics
like exorbitant overdraft fees, impacting low-income individuals
the most;224 and (4) barriers to generic drug competition have
overwhelmingly affected uninsured patients.225 The reality is
that, while antitrust assumes that market forces should correct
inefficiencies like racism, dominant groups can lock in their
power, reap above-market profits, and exploit markets in ways
that wouldn’t occur if people of color could freely compete.226 Due
to the inertias of positive feedback loops and transaction costs,
it is noteworthy that markets do not naturally self-correct for
the anticompetitive effects of racism.227
In fact, dominant groups have consciously relied on
anticompetitive practices to exclude people of color, immigrants,
and other disaffected groups. For instance, Erika Wilson
examined social closure to explain school segregation.228 Social
closure is a subordination theory about the ways dominant
groups rely on in-group characteristics to prevent outsiders from
competing for scarce resources.229 She found that dominant

223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
224. See Marco Di Maggio et al., Life Below Zero: Predatory Overdrafts,
Payday Lending and the Underbanked 10 (May 11, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript), https://perma.cc/5Q5W-AQ4H (PDF) (“In recent years, in an
effort to force banks to refrain from potentially predatory overdraft practices,
retail customers have sued financial institutions arguing that aggressive
overdraft practices disproportionally impact low income clients.”).
225. See Hosp. Auth. v. Momenta Pharms., Inc., 333 F.R.D. 390, 407–08
(M.D. Tenn. 2019) (discussing a quarter-billion-dollar anticompetitive scheme
that specifically harmed the uninsured); see also Mike Leonard, Momenta,
Sandoz Get $120 Million Lovenox Settlement Approved, BLOOMBERG L. (June
1, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://perma.cc/K5K6-6PKP (noting that group hospitals,
insurers, pension funds, and uninsured consumers filed an antitrust lawsuit
against Momenta and Sandoz).
226. See Roithmayr, supra note 214, at 735 (“A market lock-in analogy
frames racism in antitrust terms, as deliberately anticompetitive conduct that
foreclosed competition and created continuing barriers to entry. Moreover, the
model explains the intuition that when it comes to race, the country’s history
of slavery and segregation continues to matter.”).
227. See id. at 764–69 (explaining how positive feedback loops stymie
diversity in the legal profession).
228. Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2382,
2388–2414 (2021).
229. See id. at 2390
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groups have long steered resources to their local schools while
raising barriers to entry for people of color.230 To Wilson, white
populations have sought to monopolize education, despite its
essential qualities, and thereby exclude people of color.231
Similarly, Daria Roithmayr’s research has found that
dominant racial groups have historically acted as cartels.232 One
example that she uncovered is barriers preventing people of
color from entering the legal market. Before the turn of the
century, white men established exclusionary rules governing
entry into the legal profession via law schools.233 For example,
some law schools refused to admit people of color and, when the
Fourteenth Amendment intervened, inferior law schools were
created.234 While legal training could have come from other
Social closure occurs when there is competition for scarce resources
such as power, prestige, or material wealth. It involves the
construction of an in-group and an excluded group. In-groups are
likely to form when individuals see an advantage in identifying and
competing for resources as a collective. The in-group often sees
themselves as socially similar in ways that limits their desire to
associate with the excluded group. The success of social closure
depends upon clearly defining membership in the in-group and
policing the sanctity of the in-group’s boundaries. (footnotes
omitted).
230. See id. at 2396
Resources that exhibit characteristics of scarcity—like high quality
schools—provide fertile ground for the process of exclusionary
social closure to take place. State laws that required racial
segregation in schools were an obvious form of horizontal
differentiation that facilitated exclusionary social closure. In the
seventeen states that had de jure school segregation, whites were
able to attend better resourced schools, which helped them to
achieve better educational outcomes. (footnotes omitted).
231. See id. at 2447 (“Owing to the historical and modern alignment of
whiteness with power and resources, [this article] argued that social closure
leads to predominantly white school districts monopolizing high-quality
schools. It further argued that the monopolization creates stark racial
disparities between school districts within metropolitan areas.”).
232. See ROITHMAYR, supra note 221, at 50–51 (discussing the rise of
racially exclusive political parties).
233. See Roithmayr, supra note 214, at 754 (“First, they enacted both
formal Jim Crow segregation laws and informal exclusionary policies to
preclude nonwhites from attending law school. Second, they adopted
admissions standards and moved legal education to the university setting, in
order to drive out alternative forms of legal education serving people of color
and immigrants.”).
234. Id. at 757–58.
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sources, white elites “moved legal education to the university
setting, in order to drive out alternative forms of legal education
serving people of color and immigrants.”235 The legacy of this
anticompetitive structure remains today, as African Americans
face barriers to entry as lawyers and as consumers of legal
services.236
The problem is that antitrust law promotes consumer
welfare in the aggregate without questioning whether at-risk
groups face heightened harm. Not only is it predictable that in
this landscape, disenfranchised groups have disproportionally
suffered the costs of anticompetitive conduct, but also that
antitrust’s design would ignore this dynamic. Whereas theorists
urge courts and commentators to scrutinize the effects felt by
the disaffected, antitrust’s framework elevates privileged
populations.237 Instead of self-correcting markets—as antitrust
assumes—structural oppression has proven enduring.238 If
heightened review applied in essential markets, it would begin
to disaggregate “consumers” by acknowledging that certain
monopolies create greater levels of harm suffered by especially
vulnerable populations.
235. Id. at 755.
236. Id. at 756.
White cartels succeeded in barring entry to the legal profession for
people of color—blacks, Latino/as, Asian-Americans, American
Indians, “immigrant agricultural workers . . . and recent political
and economic refugees from the Caribbean, Latin America, and
Asia”—until the 1960s. At the turn of the century, most law schools
formally or informally excluded all nonwhites. As late as 1939,
thirty-four of the eighty-eight accredited law schools had formal
policies excluding blacks and other nonwhite groups. (alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted).
237. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 386–87 (1987) (noting that
damages awarded in antitrust lawsuits tend to lack exactitude, thereby
denying some victims, often minority victims, the benefits they are owed). See
generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM (1992).
238. Roithmayr, supra note 214, at 731–32.
But concepts from antitrust doctrine and economic theory can be
used to tell another, far more radical, market failure story about
persistent racial disparity—a story of monopoly, in which whites
anticompetitively excluded people of color to monopolize
competition, and then used that monopoly power to lock in
standards of competition that favored whites. (footnote omitted).
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In fact, the elevated anticompetitive effects in essential
markets were recognized by the Sherman Act’s drafters who
used such dangers as evidence to enact the statute in the first
place.239 Given the longstanding role of antitrust’s history in
defining enforcement, the next discussion reviews the
congressional record and other historical sources to assert that
the “necessaries of life” should entail a meaningful facet of
antitrust.
2. Historical Support for the “Necessaries of Life”
As background, when the Sherman Act was enacted in
1890, it was common for leaders of an industry to form a trust
by placing controlling shares of their firms into a holding
company, governed by a trustee or board of directors.240 Those
who ran the trust could raise prices, set output levels, divide
markets, and forego competing.241 Notable trusts were
organized by magnates such as J.P. Morgan and J.D.
Rockefeller.242 As Americans increasingly blamed the trusts for
high prices, unemployment and other ills, Congress debated the
enactment of an “Anti-Trust” statute.243 The following
discussion traces the debates to show how necessities motivated
the Sherman Act’s passage, which is imperative given the role
of antitrust’s enactment process throughout the history of
enforcement.
For example, Senator John Sherman asserted, “we should
not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale
of any of the necessaries of life,” warning that the trusts wielded
“a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of
239. See SUSAN BERFIELD, THE HOUR OF FATE: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, J.P.
MORGAN, AND THE BATTLE TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN CAPITALISM 111–12 (2020)
(explaining that the Sherman Act was Congress’s second attempt to limit big
business).
240. See id. at 113 (“The only power that can protect the public from
companies that want to control the production of such essentials as sugar, salt,
flour, cotton, even oil, Harlan wrote, is national power.”).
241. See id. at 211 (explaining the public outrage over price fixing and
other political favoritism by the railroad trusts).
242. See James F. Rill & Stacy L. Turner, Presidents Practicing Antitrust:
Where to Draw the Line?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 577, 579–80 (2014) (discussing
President Franklin Roosevelt’s views of trusts owned by Morgan and
Rockefeller).
243.
See BERFIELD, supra note 239, at 111–12.
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government . . . .”244 Lawyers and politicians at the Sherman
Act’s enactment described essentials as the “necessaries of
life.”245 In paying heightened attention to necessities, Senator
Sherman asserted that “all combinations among persons or
corporations for the purpose of raising or controlling the
prices . . . of the necessaries of life are monopolies and
intolerable, and ought to receive condemnation.”246 He urged
further that the “trusts and combinations are great wrongs to
the people” because “[t]hey increase beyond reason the cost of
the necessaries of life,” enabling powerful firms to “aggregate to
themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion which makes
the people poor.”247 The issue, to Senator Sherman, was that
certain monopolies can levy a greater degree of harm, causing
the “mind” to be “agitated with problems that may disturb social
order.”248

244. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (emphasis added).
245. For example, nineteenth century statutes made it illegal for a man to
deprive his wife of the necessaries of life, see, e.g., Evans v. Noonan, 128 P.
794, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912) (concluding that medical services were
“necessaries of life”); Wagner v. Wagner, 37 P. 935, 936 (Cal. 1894) (“Civ. Code,
§ 105, makes the willful neglect of the husband to provide for his wife the
common necessaries of life, when he has the ability so to do, a ground for
divorce, if such neglect continues for one year.”), stores to operate on Sundays
unless selling the necessaries of life, see, e.g., State v. Jacques, 40 A. 398, 398
(N.H. 1898) (articulating that “Pub. St. c. 271. § 5,” which prohibited keeping
a shop, restaurant, or similar place open on Sunday, did not prevent “the sale
of milk, bread and other necessaries of life”), and that a husband must answer
for his wife’s debts when incurred in purchasing the necessaries of life, see,
e.g., Lenhoff v. Fisher, 48 N.W. 821, 822 (Neb. 1891) (discussing a Nebraska
law requiring payment of “any debt contracted by any person in the purchase
of the actual necessaries of life for himself and family”). At this time, courts
defined the necessaries of life as “not only primitive physical needs, [but also]
things absolutely indispensable to human existence and decency, but those
things, also, which are in fact necessary,” including food, medicines, shelter,
and clothing, among others. State v. Waller, 136 P. 215, 215 (Kan. 1913); see
Evans, 128 P. at 795 (describing the necessaries of life as “such things as are
proper and requisite for the sustenance of man”); Jacques, 40 A. at 398
(identifying milk, bread, drugs, and medicines as necessaries of life).
246. 21 CONG. REC. 2458 (1890) (emphasis added).
247. Id. at 2461.
248. Id. at 2460.
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In fact, the trusts that inspired the Sherman Act involved
essential goods such as steel,249 oil,250 and wheat.251 While
federal enforcers had initially sought to bust the sugar trust in
1894, the government’s first major victory occurred when the
DOJ broke up Morgan’s railroad trust in Northern Securities Co.
v. United States.252 This case was especially important because
the railroads provided the only viable means to travel the
country.253
Historical evidence can also be found in the writings of
judges and politicians at the turn of the century. Justice Harlan
stated in 1895 that antitrust must prevent the monopolization
of “essentials”254 and “articles necessary to the comfort and
well-being of the people in all the states.”255 To Presidents Taft
and Roosevelt,256 the trusts threatened wage-earners by
controlling and inflating the prices of essentials.257 As one jurist
249. See United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 457 (1920)
(rejecting the government’s attempt to dissolve U.S. Steel under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act).
250. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 183 (1931)
(reversing the district court’s ruling and rejecting the government’s contention
that Standard Oil violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
251. See Kan. Wheat Growers’ Ass’n v. Oden, 257 P. 975, 975–76 (Kan.
1927) (holding that a wheat delivery contract between the Kansas Wheat
Growers’ Association and one of its members did not violate Kansas’s
anti-monopoly statute).
252. 193 U.S. 197 (1904); see id. at 360 (concluding that allowing Morgan’s
railroad trust to survive a Sherman Act challenge would defeat Congress’s
intent in enacting the Act).
253. See Rick Ewig, The Railroad and the Frontier West, 3 ORG. AM.
HISTORIANS MAG. HIST. 9, 9–10 (1988) (discussing the Transcontinental
Railroad’s significance in the second half of the 19th century).
254. See BERFIELD, supra note 239, at 224 (stating that Justice Harlan was
the lone dissenter from the Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss the
government’s prosecution of the Sugar Trust).
255. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 44 (1895).
256. See WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME
COURT 89–96 (1914); see also James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:
Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–
1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 302 (1989) (“Taft characterized the Sherman Act
as an important safeguard for basic economic rights and political freedom and
heavily stressed that recent Sherman Act jurisprudence had developed within
the larger context of judicial concerns and methodology embodied in
contemporary constitutional adjudication.”).
257. See BERFIELD, supra note 239, at 224 (“Roosevelt himself later wrote
of the Knight case: ‘This decision left the National Government, that is the
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remarked in 1903, “Pools, trusts, and conspiracies to fix or
maintain the prices of the necessaries of life strike at the
foundations of government . . . .”258 He also implied that the
monopolization of necessities may elevate switching costs,
asserting that the trusts “raise the cost of living and lower the
price of wages; take from the average American freeman the
ability to supply his family with necessary, adequate and
wholesome food . . . because the head of the house cannot earn
enough to feed and clothe his family.”259
In light of history’s role throughout the course of
enforcement, courts and politicians were intent on promoting
social and economic welfare in especially essential markets.260
To the degree that antitrust is meant to align with its historical
purpose, courts and enforcers should prioritize the ways in
which competition in essential markets promotes consumer
welfare.
D. Conclusions
Since welfare losses are reliably greater in essential
markets, a variation of the quick look offers an effective tool on
several fronts. Recalling that antitrust relies on microeconomic
theory, the greater incorporation of inelasticity into the analysis
would improve antitrust’s internal logic as well as accord with
case law in which heightened scrutiny should apply where
anticompetitive effects are reliably greater. Given the courts’
freedom to (re)interpret enforcement due to the paucity of text
in the Sherman Act, the proposal is tenable.261 And rather than
significantly raising the risk of liability, the approach would
encourage firms to take more ex ante steps to guarantee that
people of the Nation, practically helpless to deal with the large combinations
of modern business.’”).
258. State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 73 S.W. 645, 652 (Mo. 1903)
(emphasis added).
259. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
260. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 19, at 277 (discussing Congress’s
vision in enacting antitrust laws and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement
of Congress’s aims).
261. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697,
697 (1975) (explaining that the case law on predatory pricing has been
characterized by vagueness and a scarcity of economic analysis).
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consumers would benefit. This proposal would even recognize
that disaffected groups suffer heightened costs in rebutting
antitrust’s assumption that consumers are largely homogenous.
Another benefit is that the quick look would provide an efficient
remedy by allowing parties to litigate antitrust disputes without
engaging in complex and costly analyses of the underlying
market. While the deference in the rule of reason may make
sense when applied to garden variety markets, courts should
impose a heightened level of review whenever the underlying
good is inelastic and socially beneficial.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Incorporating necessities into antitrust’s framework would
produce additional benefits. First, it would assuage a debate
between the new and old guards of antitrust scholarship.
Second, the proposal would add a meaningful consideration to
merger enforcement, especially if done retroactively. Third, it
would harmonize aspects of antitrust’s framework by
recognizing that the enterprise does, in fact, scrutinize subject
matter in a few situations, including agency enforcement and
criminal sanctions.
A. Resolving Policy Debate
Antitrust’s evolution toward minimalism has inspired a
scholarly movement—known as “Neo-Brandeisians” or even
“hipster antitrust”—which has been met by a forceful rebuke.262
Neo-Brandeisians assert that antitrust’s laissez-faire
framework has allowed firms in the technology, pharmaceutical,
and similar industries to dominate commerce.263 Their claim is
that antitrust enforcers must conduct real investigations and
impose actual penalties on today’s trusts, given the deferential
262. See John M. Newman, Reactionary Antitrust, 4 CONCURRENCES REVUE
66, 66 (2019) (discussing the desire for more antitrust enforcement); see also
Christopher S. Yoo, Hipster Antitrust: New Bottles, Same Old W(h)ine?, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 2 (“In the midst of these developments, a
recent outcry over what is sometimes called ‘Neo-Brandeis’ or more often and
more colorfully, ‘Hipster Antitrust’ has come to the forefront.”).
263. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 1497, 1502 (“[D]igital markets facilitate uniquely durable market power,
in ways that reach far beyond what previous analyses have imagined.”).
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approach in the consumer welfare era.264 But to the old guard,
this movement threatens to set antitrust back decades to when
the enterprise obliged populist demands in imposing unruly
liability.265 At the heart of this debate is the embrace of the rule
of reason, which has placed microeconomic theory at the center
of enforcement as well as evolved antitrust law into a
notoriously deferential body of law.266
Use of the quick look to scrutinize essential goods would
bridge a gap between the two schools of antitrust thought. The
approach would preserve the deference in the rule of reason and
protect Chicago’s desire for minimal enforcement.267 It would
also assuage concerns of Neo-Brandeisians regarding the depth
of actual harms suffered by consumers in critical markets. By
recognizing the saliency of essential goods, it would prioritize
the concerns of both Neo-Brandeisians and the Chicago School
as they jostle over antitrust’s trajectory.
In fact, the quick look in essential markets would resolve
concerns of populism expressed by, especially, the Chicago
School. As discussed in Part III, courts and scholars favor
greater usage of the quick look yet critics contend that no bright
line indicates when it should apply. The fear is that courts are
264. See id. (“Digital defendants have received, and continue to receive, a
free pass in the form of de jure and de facto immunity and leniency. This
Article proposes an immediate reversal of that mistaken course.” (footnote
omitted)); Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement
Against Platform MFNs, 127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2201–02 (2018) (arguing for
enhanced antitrust enforcement).
265.
See Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious
Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 294 (2019)
But this revolution is a blast from antitrust’s past in many ways. It
calls for the return of populism in antitrust enforcement. It declares
the modern antitrust era—and the consumer welfare standard
itself—a failure. This new revolution lays at antitrust law’s feet a
myriad of perceived socio-political problems, including, but not
limited to, rising inequality, employee wage concerns, and the
concentration of political power.
266. See, e.g., id. at 358 (“These critics reveal a profound lack of
understanding of the consumer welfare model and the rule of reason
framework. In reality, the consumer welfare approach to antitrust analysis
already considers a variety of factors including, quality, variety, and
innovation.”).
267. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the Chicago
School); see also Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 19, at 277 (stating that the
Chicago School led the counterrevolution in antirust).
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more likely to condemn a defendant under the quick look—not
due to a clear standard—but when the public demands the head
of a notorious villain.268 This fear has notably prevented the
quick look from taking root.269 Given the divide between
Neo-Brandeisians and Chicago School, use of the quick look in
essential markets would provide a clear standard based on
inelasticity yet avoid the concerns of populism voiced by
adherents to the Chicago School. It could indeed harmonize
factions of antitrust scholarship. This proposal could also affect
merger enforcement.
B. Retroactive Review
Two federal agencies, the DOJ and Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), have authority under the Clayton
Antitrust Act to contest mergers that overly concentrate market
power and degrade consumer welfare.270 Over the past few
decades, the agencies have deferentially reviewed mergers in a
manner akin to Section 1 and 2 enforcement.271 Due to the risks
of overenforcement, federal agencies have largely avoided
blocking mergers unless they can fairly accurately predict the
anticompetitive effects.272 However, given the dangers of
268. See Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing, supra note 194, at 852
(explaining the quick look approach’s “populist notions”).
269. See Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look, supra note 29, at 464 (“The
quick look is an artifact of a bygone Populist era in which courts and
enforcement agencies protected the freedom of traders from contractual
restraints deemed ‘monopolistic’ by the applied price theory school of
industrial organization.”).
270. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 1 (outlining
DOJ and FTC’s “principal analytical techniques, practices, and the
enforcement policy . . . with respect to mergers and acquisitions”); Ass’n of the
Bar of N.Y.C. Comm. on Antitrust & Trade Regul., Recent Developments in
Four Areas of Antitrust Law: Merger Enforcement; Criminal Enforcement and
Health Care Initiatives; Exclusionary Conduct, and the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine and State Action Immunity, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 451, 453 (2003)
(outlining the agencies’ authority to contest anticompetitive mergers).
271. See Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S.
Merger Review: Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
159, 177 (2008) (explaining that the agencies receive little deference in
enforcing mergers).
272. See id. at 179 (stating that when a judge cannot make a reliable
prediction regarding the consequences of a merger, the judge will conclude that
the case is “not proven” and will rule against the plaintiff).
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mergers
in
essential
markets—such
as
bank
mergers273federal enforcers should increase scrutiny via an
effective and controversial strategy: the FTC and DOJ should
wait to review a merger’s effects on an essential market until
some period after the merger closes.
By viewing a merger retroactively, enforcers could assess
whether the reduction of competition allowed the surviving firm
to extract human costs or, alternatively, create efficiencies.274 To
do so, the inquiry should ask whether the merger has especially
harmed marginalized populations. If a merger later proves to
have deprived disaffected groups of, as examples, critical drugs,
financial services, or housing, the agencies could rectify this
harm by retroactively reviewing the acquisition. Antitrust
enforcers may also scrutinize whether the anticompetitive
effects include unreasonably high switching costs as discussed
in Part III. This would entail a modest reconfiguration of merger
policy, as federal agencies have already recognized the
heightened dangers of anticompetitive acquisitions in inelastic
markets.275
Critics may contend that revisiting a merger after agency
approval appears unfair. After all, firms depend on the agencies’
blessing to effectuate acquisitions.276 However, Menesh Patel
has shown that the agencies should ideally ramp up ex post
investigations of anticompetitive combinations where justice
dictates.277 To Patel, the agencies labor under such incomplete
information, and the dangers of anticompetitive mergers are so

273. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (outlining the problems
of monopoly power in the financial services industry).
274. See Brian A. Facey, The Future of Looking Back: The Efficient
Modeling of Subsequent Review, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 519, 523 (1999) (stating
that agencies may incorrectly predict a merger’s efficiencies because the claims
are asserted by self-interested parties and it is difficult for both the agencies
and the merging parties to predict outcomes).
275. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 6–7
(discussing targeted customers and price discrimination).
276. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390 (1976) (establishing the notification and
review process for mergers).
277. See Menesh Patel, Merger Breakups, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1011
(2020) (stating that expansion of agency challenges to previously reviewed and
cleared mergers could generate substantial competitive benefits).
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great, that ex post enforcement would make good policy.278
Moreover, as Patel found, the FTC and DOJ enjoy the power to
review a merger before and after its consummation without
question.279 The benefit of emphasizing essentialness in merger
enforcement is that it would achieve the benefits identified by
Patel as well as make retroactive review foreseeable, restrained,
and equitable. The agencies should therefore consider
challenging combinations which diminish the welfare of
vulnerable populations, given the difficulties of doing so prior to
the merger.
C. Caveats
It is worth mentioning a few caveats; the importance of the
underlying good does, in fact, affect antitrust in a few
idiosyncratic ways. These areas involve indirect mechanisms
such as how federal agencies pick antitrust cases, how
competitors must provide an essential facility, and how
antitrust courts impose criminal penalties as well as define the
relevant market. Given the importance of incorporating
necessities into the actual analysis and the value of harmonizing
substantive facets of enforcement, the following discussion
reviews certain areas in which necessities do currently affect
enforcement.
1. Picking a Target
The subject matter’s saliency has influenced how the FTC
and DOJ choose litigation targets.280 In 2019, for example, the
DOJ investigated mergers in the marijuana industry.281 This

278. See id. at 995–96 (discussing constraints on information available to
agencies).
279. See id. at 977 (“These merger challenges and potential breakups
would occur within the existing federal merger review scheme, the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. That scheme has guided federal merger antitrust
review since 1976 and obligates the antitrust agencies to evaluate mergers for
their expected competitive effects prior to consummation.”).
280. See D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating
Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2016) (stating that “big is bad”
has been a “bogeyman” of antitrust since the time of Standard Oil).
281. See Betsy Woodruff Swan, Senior DOJ Official Pushes Back against
Former Top Aide’s Testimony, POLITICO (July 1, 2020, 10:01 PM),
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caused confusion among observers and even attorneys in the
DOJ because the marijuana market seemed adequately
competitive.282 Whistleblower testimony soon alleged that the
investigation stemmed from the Attorney General, William
Barr, who personally detests the marijuana industry.283
Similarly, the DOJ announced its intention to contest
telecommunication mergers because increased concentration in
the telecommunications industry would raise prices and erode
free speech.284
Given the agencies’ limited resources, it stands to reason
that the agencies would target certain types of anticompetitive
practices based, in part, on the necessity of the underlying
market.285 This also suggests that the biases of government
actors may influence enforcement even if the importance of
subject matter lacks an official place in the analysis. Thus, while
courts apply the same analysis regardless of industry, the type
of industry may inspire the federal agencies to act.

https://perma.cc/R94L-6PH6 (recounting the DOJ’s involvement in “an
unusually thorny legal issue: marijuana mergers”).
282. See Karl Bode, Barr DOJ Weaponized Antitrust to Launch Flimsy
Inquiries into Legal Weed Companies, TECH DIRT (June 25, 2020, 10:45 AM),
https://perma.cc/7KRH-HP99 (reporting on a whistleblower’s claims that
“Barr’s DOJ launched inquiries into marijuana companies and smaller
mergers that in no way posed competitive or monopolistic threats”).
283. See Swan, supra note 281 (“[The whistleblower] testified that
Attorney General William Barr called Antitrust Division leaders to his office
for a meeting and then ordered them to scrutinize mergers of marijuana
companies because he himself held personal animus toward the industry.”);
Ben German, DOJ Whistleblower to Allege Political Interference in Antitrust
Probes, AXIOS (June 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/HQ7E-RF7S (sharing claims
that the DOJ reviewed marijuana company mergers “because [Barr] did not
like the nature of their underlying business” (alteration in original)).
284. See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement,
United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 84 Fed. Reg. 39862, 39875 (Aug. 12,
2019) (“The market for retail mobile wireless service in the United States is
highly concentrated and would become more so if T-Mobile were allowed to
acquire Sprint.”); Makan Delrahim, “ . . . And Justice for All”: Antitrust
Enforcement and Digital Gatekeepers, DOJ (June 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8USB-434K (warning of the risks of consolidations in the
telecommunications industry)..
285. Cf. Samuel Weinstein, Anticompetitive Merger Review 39 (June 29,
2021) (unpublished manuscript) (asserting that the agency’s finite resources
and attention demand careful selection of cases).
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2. Essential Facilities
One of the most controversial—and fledgling—antitrust
doctrines concerns “essential facilities.”286 A firm that owns a
forum, venue, or platform may not exclude rivals if the facility
is essential for competition.287 Over the years, courts have
invoked the doctrine with respect to sports stadiums,288 railroad
terminals,289 telecommunication networks,290 and other venues
in which a company dominates the market by refusing to offer
access to its facility.291 To assert the doctrine, a plaintiff must
establish “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2)
a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the
essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.”292

286. See Salil K. Mehra, Competition Law for a Post-Scarcity World, 4 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2016) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court, if not
foreclosing [the essential facilities doctrine] outright, has at least kept a wary
distance.”); see also Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126
YALE L.J. 710, 801 (2017) (“In 2004, however, the Court disavowed the
essential facilities doctrine in dicta, leading several commentators to wonder
whether it is a dead letter.”).
287. See Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust
Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1996
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1996)
As originally conceived, when a monopolist or near-monopolist
controlling what is deemed an ‘essential facility’ denies an actual or
potential competitor access to that facility, where the facility cannot
reasonably be duplicated and where there is no valid technical or
business justification for denying access, then the doctrine is
applied.
288. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(“Hecht contends that the District Court erred in failing to give his requested
instruction concerning the ‘essential facility’ doctrine. We agree.”).
289. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383,
406–07 (1912) (explaining the essential facilities doctrine in the railroad
context).
290. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir.
1983) (“Finally, the evidence supports the jury’s determination that AT & T
denied the essential facilities, the interconnections for FX and CCSA service,
when they could have been feasibly provided.”).
291. See generally Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential
Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1999) (explaining the essential
facilities doctrine).
292. Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569 (2d
Cir. 1990) (quoting MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132–33).
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The saliency of the essential facilities doctrine is that it
suggests a way to value characteristics of an antitrust dispute
beyond conduct. Under this doctrine, courts have declared that
certain forums play an elevated role in competition.293 The
theory heightens a monopolist’s duty to preserve competition
due to the vital nature of its facility.294
That said, the essential facilities doctrine has rapidly fallen
out of favor.295 It is a longstanding tenet of antitrust that firms
owe no duty to help their rivals, making the doctrine a glaring
departure from the rule.296 Given that the essential facility
doctrine lies in tension with core antitrust principles, courts and
scholars have described the doctrine as “on the ropes.”297 As one
court remarked in quoting the leading treatise: “The so-called
‘essential facility’ doctrine is one of the most troublesome,
incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2 liability.
The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if
it were jettisoned . . . .”298 In light of this criticism, few courts
have found a plausible offense based upon the denial of an
essential facility.
A significant part of the problem is that the essential
facilities doctrine is geared to favoring competitors rather than
consumers.299 The question is hardly about whether consumers

293. See Mary L. Azcuenaga, Essential Facilities and Regulation: Court or
Agency Jurisdiction?, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 879, 881, 883 (1989) (explaining that
courts assess test whether a forum is essential by evaluating how long it would
take a competitor to duplicate the forum).
294. See Robert Pitoksfky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under
United States Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITURST L.J. 443, 452 (2002) (emphasizing
the importance of ensuring competition).
295. See Diane P. Wood, The Old New (or Is It the New Old) Antitrust: “I’m
Not Dead Yet!!”, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5 (2019) (discussing the obsolescence of
the essential facilities doctrine).
296. See Pitoksfky et al., supra note 294, at 458–59 (explaining that a firm
rarely has a duty to aid its competitor’s ability to survive in the market).
297. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Problem of Search Engines as Essential
Facilities: An Economic & Legal Assessment, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE:
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 419, 433 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus
eds., 2010).
298. Z-Tel Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540
(E.D. Tex. 2004) (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 305 (2d ed. 1999)).
299. See MCI Commc’ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132–33 (stating that under
the essential facilities doctrine, a monopolist who controls the gateway to a
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would benefit if the doctrine was applied, but whether
competitors need it. This is significant because antitrust courts
have recited ad nauseum that antitrust’s purpose is to promote
the welfare of consumers, not competitors.300 Since the doctrine
creates a duty to help one’s rival—an antitrust anomaly in
several ways—plaintiffs cannot possibly bank on winning a
lawsuit based on this doctrine even though it technically
remains good law.301
However, courts could promote the essentialness of certain
goods without running into the same problems created by the
essential facilities doctrine. Whereas the doctrine creates
friction by seeking to benefit competitors, the recognition that
certain markets are essential would apply the economic theories
at antitrust’s heart to inure the benefits of competition to
consumers. This would indeed foster consumer welfare
regardless of what competitors want or need, squaring the
proposal with contemporary antitrust and in stark contrast to
the fledgling essential facilities doctrine.
3. Imposing Criminal Liability
Another example illustrating the importance of the
underlying good concerns the sentencing portion of criminal
antitrust enforcement. In 2020, the former CEO of Bumble Bee
Tuna was sentenced to three years in prison for orchestrating a
conspiracy to fix canned tuna prices.302 Judge Edward Chen of
the U.S. Northern District of California imposed a stiff
sentence—prison time is a rarity in antitrust cases—lamenting
second market may be required to grant competitors access to that facility,
favoring competitors).
300. See Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 488
(8th Cir. 1985) (“[A]ntitrust laws exist for ‘the protection of competition, not
competitors.’” (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo-Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 488 (1977))).
301. See Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. Civ. A.
H-06-175, 2006 WL 801033, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006) (“The essential
facilities doctrine has been described by Judge Lake as ‘often
criticized . . . [,but] nevertheless . . . a viable part of the federal antitrust
laws.’” (quoting David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Co., 995 F. Supp. 728, 751
(S.D. Tex. 1998))).
302. See Dave Sebastian, Former Bumble Bee CEO Sentenced for Role in
Tuna Price-Fixing Scheme, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2020, 9:37 AM),
https://perma.cc/JMZ8-7CL9.
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the harm of collusion in food markets: “This is food, food for
people who, I think it’s fair to assume, include those at the lower
end of the socioeconomic scale based on the pricing of the
product. So the impact has particular meaning.”303 The DOJ’s
antitrust chief agreed with the court’s logic, asserting that
courts must especially deter price-fixing in food markets via
criminal penalties.304
4. Defining the Market
It should also be noted that whether a good is inelastic can
affect the market definition question. To show that the
defendant harmed market competition, plaintiffs must
adequately define the relevant market to prove such a harm.305
For instance, if two gas stations in Chicago colluded to fix gas
prices, consumers would likely visit other gas stations thereby
keeping prices low; in turn, the antitrust claim would likely fail
because the overall market remained intact. With this in mind,
a plaintiff must generally define the market in order to show
whether the restraint did in fact harm it.306 Elasticity enters the
calculus when the plaintiff endeavors to show that the proffered
market is inelastic and thus concerns only the monopolized
good307—but if a good’s demand is elastic, the market’s

303. Malathi Nayak, Ex-Bumble Bee CEO Gets Prison Term, a Rarity in
Antitrust, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2020, 6:17 PM), https://perma.cc/85SD-4BAK.
304. See Press Release, DOJ, Former Bumble CEO Sentenced to Prison for
Fixing Prices of Canned Tuna (June 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/4ZZX-F2CX
(“Executives who cheat American consumers out of the benefits of competition
will be brought to justice, particularly when their antitrust crimes affect the
most basic necessity, food.”).
305. See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 556,
566 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“In demonstrating that allegedly anticompetitive conduct
imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade, a plaintiff must prove what
market . . . was restrained and that the defendants played a significant role in
the relevant market. It follows that relevant market definition is central to the
analysis . . . .” (citations omitted)).
306. See Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 713 F. Supp.
2d 286, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In order to plead an antitrust violation under
the rule of reason, a plaintiff must allege a relevant market, including both a
product market and a geographic market.”).
307. See, e.g., Mooney v. AXA Advisors, L.L.C., 19 F. Supp. 3d 486, 499
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (analyzing whether the underlying good is inelastic for
purposes of defining the market).
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definition must include all interchangeable products.308 By
effect, plaintiffs face a tougher task of substantiating a claim in
elastic markets due to the substitutability of items whereas
plaintiffs in inelastic markets can more easily show monopoly
power as the defendant controls and operates the entire market.
The point is that antitrust has incorporated matters of
essentialness and inelasticity into certain parts of enforcement.
It’s missing, however, in the substantive analysis of whether an
exclusionary act should be considered anticompetitive or
procompetitive. If antitrust’s framework applied the quick look
whenever a necessity was restrained, it would harmonize
aspects of enforcement rather than creating an entirely new
analysis.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the heightened magnitude of harms
suffered by consumers when firms monopolize or otherwise
restrain trade in essential markets. Since consumers lack the
power to mitigate damages when purchasing necessities—as
they cannot safely buy substitutes or nothing at all—the
monopolist can restrict supply and increase prices to a greater
degree than with garden variety goods.309 The added premium
in essential markets entails a human cost of collusion, as it
equates to the need of vulnerable consumers. Antitrust courts
should no longer apply the same analysis to inelastic necessities
like certain drugs, labor, and food as it does to garden variety
goods like baseball cards. The human cost is indeed much
greater for the former than the latter.310
Another takeaway is the disparate effects on marginalized
populations. Antitrust law pays little or no attention to whether
people of color, women, undocumented workers, and other
disaffected groups suffer greater costs.311 The uneven effects

308. See Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“For antitrust purposes, a market is composed of products that
have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are
produced—price, use and qualities considered.” (internal quotation omitted)).
309. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
310. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 19, at 285–86 (emphasizing the
harm some monopolies create).
311. See supra Part I.A.
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come as little surprise since, according to critical race theory,
dominant groups have historically relied on anticompetitive
practices to exclude people of color and monopolize scarce
resources.312 It is also predictable that antitrust misses this
dynamic, as antitrust’s framework tends to view markets as
self-correcting and consumers as homogenous.313 This Article
endeavors to disaggregate this concept of consumers by
incorporating inelasticity and essentialness into the substantive
analysis. In understanding the ways exclusionary practices in
essential markets are especially likely to injure marginalized
groups via high-priced foods or drugs, the analysis could better
foster consumer welfare by acknowledging the disproportional
costs imposed on historically marginalized populations.
To do so, courts could simply apply the quick look analysis
to suspect acts arising in inelastic markets for necessities. This
would, in effect, swap the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff
to the defendant, who would then be required to prove that the
restraint was ultimately procompetitive.314 It would resolve
longstanding confusion about when the quick look is
appropriate, assuaging the hesitancy of courts to apply the
standard despite overwhelming support shown to it by
scholarship. This approach could also help to resolve the
emerging debate between Neo-Brandeisians—who assert that
antitrust has deferentially allowed powerful monopolies to form
in the most important markets—and the old guard who claim
that “hipster antitrust” threatens to revive antitrust’s historic
problem.315 Targeting necessities under the quick look could
largely keep antitrust in place as the old guard prefers, but also
redress the concerns of Neo-Brandeisians who receive much of
their motivation from monopolies in the tech, pharmaceutical,
labor, and other critical markets.

312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text.
Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution, supra note 12, at 460–61.
Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look, supra note 29, at 463 n.16.
See supra Part IV.A.

